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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

AUSTIN ROTH, BRANDON ROSE, and
ALEXANDER FONSECA, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WOOT.COM LLC, as a wholly owned subsidiary
of AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC,

Defendant.

CASE NO.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiffs Austin Roth, Brandon Rose, and Alexander Fonseca (“Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by and through their undersigned counsel, bring this class action complaint against Defendant Woot.com LLC, as a wholly owned subsidiary of Amazon.com Services LLC (“Woot” or “Defendant”), which is engaged in the business of, among other things, the sale and delivery of pre-recorded audio-visual materials, including video games containing prerecorded content, through its website <https://www.woot.com/> (the “Website”). Plaintiffs allege the following upon information and belief based on the investigation

1 of counsel, except as to those allegations that specifically pertain to Plaintiffs, which are alleged
2 upon personal knowledge.

3 NATURE OF THE ACTION

4 1. In recent years, courts across the country have recognized that opaque digital-
5 information tracking practices pose a profound threat to Americans' privacy. The unauthorized
6 collection of a person's browsing activity, website interactions, and device identifiers,
7 particularly when the aforementioned information is combined with persistent identifiers that
8 can link otherwise anonymous online activity to a specific individual, constitutes an unlawful
9 invasion of the reasonable expectation of privacy that the federal Video Privacy Protection Act,
10 the federal Wiretap Act, and analog state laws were enacted to protect.

11 2. Woot describes itself as the "original deals site" and claims that it offers "multiple
12 daily deals and other short-term sales across seven (7) different categories."¹ Among the
13 categories of products Woot sells and delivers through the Website are pre-recorded audio-visual
14 materials, including video games that contain prerecorded video content. Website users can
15 browse and purchase items directly from the Website, often at discount prices (the "Users").
16 Users can also acquire and/or purchase pre-recorded audio-visual materials through the Website,
17 such as video games containing cut scenes ("Purchasers").

18 3. Users can sign in to the Website through a Woot or Amazon account. However,
19 an Amazon account is required to purchase any item on the Website.²

20 4. Defendant begins placing and transmitting third-party tracking technologies
21 immediately upon a User's initial visit to the Website, before Users receive any meaningful
22 notice or opportunity to control the interception or dissemination of their data. Woot transmits
23 Users' electronic communications and online activity to third-party advertising and analytics
24 companies (the "Tracking Entities"), including Meta Platforms, Inc. ("Meta") (formerly known
25

26 ¹ *Woot! FAQ*, WOOT, https://www.woot.com/faq?ref=w_ft_bs_rp&tab=general (last visited Mar. 16, 2026).

² *Changes to Woot!'s Payment Process*, WOOT (July 25, 2023) <https://forums.woot.com/t/changes-to-woot-s-payment-process/1443009> (last visited Mar. 16, 2026).

1 as Facebook, Inc.), through cookies, pixels, and similar tracking tools (the “Tracking Tools”).
2 This tracking captures detailed interaction and behavioral data, including detailed URLs visited
3 by Users, the name of products purchased by Users, the titles of buttons clicked by Users, forms
4 filled out by Users, at what stage of the visit the User is in (e.g., product view, adding to cart,
5 checking out, etc.), and other on-page elements interacted with by Users.

6 5. The data intercepted and collected by the Tracking Tools also includes routing
7 and addressing information, including location information, IP addresses, and persistent
8 identifiers used to identify the source of communications and the destination for the data. The
9 Tracking Tools also capture and transmit device and technical identifiers such as device type,
10 operating system, browser type, user identifiers that enable recognition across sessions and
11 websites, and approximate geolocation data. The Tracking Entities use this data to infer Users’
12 interests, preferences, age, location, or other characteristics based on the Users’ behavior on the
13 Website. Collectively, the information intercepted, collected, captured, and transmitted by the
14 Tracking Tools to the Tracking Entities is referred to herein as “Sensitive Information.”

15 6. Defendant does not disclose on the Website that Users’ Sensitive Information
16 would be captured by Tracking Tools on the Website, and then transmitted to the Tracking
17 Entities, including Meta, for use in marketing and analytics activities conducted by the Tracking
18 Entities and Defendant.

19 7. The Website’s use of the Tracking Tools resulted in violations of the federal
20 Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2710, and the federal Wiretap Act (“Wiretap
21 Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., as well as violations of analogous state wiretap statutes, and
22 unlawful invasions into Users’ privacy.

23 8. The Tracking Tools’ capture and transmission of Users’ Sensitive Information to
24 the Tracking Entities is achieved through Defendant’s knowing utilization of the Tracking Tools
25 on the Website.
26

1 9. Defendant chose to implement the Tracking Tools on the Website, the use of
2 which allowed the Tracking Tools to transmit Users' Sensitive Information to the Tracking
3 Entities, which includes data that identifies Users' requests and Purchasers' acquisition of video
4 games containing cut scenes by title and description.

5 10. Included within the Sensitive Information exposed by Defendant's use of the
6 Tracking Tools is information identifying Purchasers' acquisitions or requests for video games
7 containing cut scenes, referred to herein as "Personal Video Information,"³ which consists of
8 Plaintiffs' and Purchasers' (i) Facebook ID ("FID," discussed and defined herein) and (ii) the
9 detailed journey of Plaintiffs and Purchasers on the Website, showing their viewing and eventual
10 purchase of pre-recorded audio video content in the form of video games containing cut scenes
11 on the Website, including a detailed URL containing the name of that item and metadata
12 containing an internal Content ID for that video game.⁴

13 11. At no point during or after the sign-up process, or anywhere on the Website for
14 that matter, does Defendant seek or obtain adequate consent for the sharing of Users' Sensitive
15 Information (which includes the subset of Purchasers' Personal Video Information), which was
16 surreptitiously captured and transmitted through the Website's use of the Tracking Tools.

17 12. Defendant purposefully implemented and utilized the Tracking Tools to secretly
18 facilitate the interception of Users' electronic communications⁵ with the Website, in the form of
19 their Sensitive Information. Defendant knew that the Tracking Tools would feed Users'
20 communications to the Tracking Entities.

21 13. The Website does not provide notice of or obtain consent as to such practices.
22

23 _____
24 ³ As used and defined herein, "Personal Video Information" is a subcategory of the defined term "Sensitive
25 Information."

26 ⁴ See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (defining personally identifiable information under the VPPA as information able to
identify users, as well as the title, description, or summary of video materials or services requested or obtained from
a video tape service provider).

⁵ The Wiretap Act defines "electronic communication" as any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds,
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic,
or photo-optical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S. C. § 2510(12).

1 14. Users of the Website have been harmed by Defendant, resulting in violations of
2 the federal Wiretap Act, the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal Code §
3 630, et seq., and the Florida Security of Communications Act (“FSCA”), Fla. Stat. § 934.01, et
4 seq. In addition to monetary damages, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief requiring Defendant to
5 immediately (i) remove the Tracking Tools from the Website, or (ii) add, and obtain, appropriate
6 consent from Users.

7 15. Plaintiffs’ claims are brought as a class action, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
8 Procedure 23, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. Plaintiffs seek relief in
9 this action individually and on behalf of Users of the Website for violations of the federal VPPA,
10 18 U.S.C. § 2710; the federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.; CIPA, including Cal. Penal
11 Code §§ 631 (illegal wiretapping) and 638.51 (unlawful use of a pen register or trap and trace
12 device); California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.;
13 the California Constitution at Art. 1, § 1; the FSCA, Fla. Stat. § 934.01, et seq., and common
14 law.

15 PARTIES

16 16. Plaintiff Austin Roth is and at all relevant times has been a citizen of California.
17 Plaintiff Roth purchased pre-recorded audio-visual materials from the Woot Website in or
18 around January 2026. On January 3, 2026, Plaintiff Roth purchased “Pokemon Scarlet” from
19 the Website. Pokemon Scarlet is a video game that contains prerecorded video content in the
20 form of animated cut scenes. Plaintiff Roth had previously purchased the video game “Tales of
21 Graces f Remastered” from the Website. Plaintiff Roth visited the Website through a Firefox
22 browser while logged into his Facebook account. Plaintiff Roth’s Facebook profile includes his
23 real name, location information (current and prior states of residency), personal photos, and
24 other personal information that identifies Plaintiff Roth as a specific individual. At no point
25 before, during, or after Plaintiff Roth’s purchases did Woot request or obtain Plaintiff Roth’s
26 prior, informed, written consent (separate and distinct from any other legal or financial

1 obligations) to the disclosure of his Personal Video Information or other Sensitive Information
2 to Meta or any other Tracking Entity. Following his interactions with the Website, Plaintiff Roth
3 has observed Woot advertisements on social media platforms, including Instagram, and has
4 experienced an apparent increase in video game-related advertisements from Woot in particular.

5 17. Plaintiff Brandon Rose is and at all relevant times has been a citizen of California.
6 Plaintiff Rose purchased pre-recorded audio-visual materials from the Woot Website in or
7 around March 2026. On March 5, 2026, Plaintiff Rose purchased “Metroid Prime 4 Beyond”
8 from the Website. Metroid Prime 4 Beyond is a video game that contains prerecorded video
9 content in the form of animated cut scenes. Plaintiff Rose had previously purchased the video
10 game “Donkey Kong Country Returns HD.” Plaintiff Rose visited the Website through a Firefox
11 browser while logged into his Facebook account. Plaintiff Rose’s Facebook profile includes his
12 real name, location information (state of residency), personal photos, and other personal
13 information that identifies Plaintiff Rose as a specific individual. At no point before, during, or
14 after Plaintiff Rose’s purchases did Woot request or obtain Plaintiff Rose’s prior, informed,
15 written consent (separate and distinct from any other legal or financial obligations) to the
16 disclosure of his Personal Video Information or other Sensitive Information to Meta or any other
17 Tracking Entity. Following his interactions with the Website, Plaintiff Rose has observed Woot
18 advertisements on social media platforms, including Twitter and Instagram, and has experienced
19 an apparent increase in video game-related advertisements from Woot in particular.

20 18. Plaintiff Alexander Fonseca is and at all relevant times has been a citizen of
21 Florida. Plaintiff Fonseca purchased pre-recorded audio-visual materials from the Woot Website
22 in or around February 2026. On February 26, 2026, Plaintiff Fonseca purchased “Dragon Ball:
23 Sparking! Zero” for the Xbox Series X from the Website. Dragon Ball: Sparking! Zero is a video
24 game that contains prerecorded video content in the form of animated cut scenes. Plaintiff
25 Fonseca visited the Website through a Chrome browser while logged into his Facebook account.
26 Plaintiff Fonseca’s Facebook profile includes his real name, location information (current and

1 prior states of residency), educational history (including current school of attendance), personal
2 photos, and other personal information that identifies Plaintiff Fonseca as a specific individual.
3 At no point before, during, or after Plaintiff Fonseca's purchases did Woot request or obtain
4 Plaintiff Fonseca's prior, informed, written consent (separate and distinct from any other legal
5 or financial obligations) to the disclosure of his Personal Video Information or other Sensitive
6 Information to Meta or any other Tracking Entity. Following his interactions with the Website,
7 Plaintiff Fonseca has observed Woot advertisements on social media platforms, including
8 Instagram, and has experienced an apparent increase in video game-related advertisements from
9 Woot in particular.

10 19. Defendant Woot.com LLC is a subsidiary of Amazon.com Services LLC.⁶ Woot
11 owns and operates the Website, having its headquarters in Carrollton, Texas. Woot, through the
12 Website, provides discounted access to a wide range of consumer products, including
13 electronics, video games, household goods, apparel, and other merchandise, including product
14 descriptions, specifications, pricing information, promotional materials, and detailed
15 information regarding available products and related services.

16 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

17 20. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because
18 it arises under the federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., and the federal VPPA, 18
19 U.S.C. § 2710. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal claims in this
20 action. This Court also has jurisdiction over this action under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28
21 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The amount in controversy exceeds \$5 million, exclusive of interest and
22 costs. The number of class members is more than 100, and at least one member of the Class
23 defined below is a citizen of a different state that is diverse from Defendant's citizenship. Thus,
24 minimal diversity exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(2)(A).

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⁶ *Who the HECK is Woot!*, WOOT, https://www.woot.com/about?ref=w_ngf_abt (last visited Apr. 21, 2026).

1 “[t]hese activities are at the core of any definition of personhood.” 134 Cong. Rec. S5397–01,
2 S. 2361 (May 10, 1988).

3 26. In 2012, Congress amended the VPPA “to reflect the realities of the 21st century.”
4 158 Cong. Rec. H6849–01 (Dec. 18, 2012).

5 27. In a Senate Judiciary Committee meeting, Senator Leahy stated, “While it is true
6 that technology has changed over the years, we must stay faithful to our fundamental right to
7 privacy and freedom. Today, social networking, video streaming, the ‘cloud,’ mobile apps, and
8 other new technologies have revolutionized the availability of Americans’ information.”⁷

9 28. Senator and Subcommittee Chair Hon. Al Franken stated:

10 One way we need to update this law is to make sure that it is keeping up with
11 technology. It used to be that if you wanted to watch a video, you had to go to the
12 video store or then wait for it in the mail after that. Now you can stream it directly
13 to your computer in seconds. Streaming is the future of video, . . . it is clear that
14 the law does cover new technologies like streaming because it does not just cover
15 “prerecorded video cassette tapes.” It also covers “similar audio-visual
16 materials.”⁸

17 29. Courts across the country have affirmed a broad reading of the VPPA and its
18 application to modern video sources, such as websites and video games.⁹

19 30. The VPPA protects consumers’ information by prohibiting the disclosure of
20 “personally identifiable information”¹⁰ (PII), including information that would readily permit
21

22 ⁷ See *Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and the Law, The Video Privacy*
23 *Protection Act: Protecting Viewer Privacy in the 21st Century*, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE
24 ON PRIVACY, TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW, [https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/hearing-transcript-the-](https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/hearing-transcript-the-video-privacy-protection-act-protecting-viewer-privacy-in-the-21st-century)
25 [video-privacy-protection-act-protecting-viewer-privacy-in-the-21st-century](https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/hearing-transcript-the-video-privacy-protection-act-protecting-viewer-privacy-in-the-21st-century) (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

26 ⁸ *Id.*

⁹ See, e.g., *Mata v. Zillow Grp., Inc.*, No.: 24-cv-01095-DMS-VET, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229061, at *8-9 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2024) (VPPA applied to real estate marketplace website); *Fan v. NBA Properties, Inc.*, No. 23-cv-05069-SI, 2024 U.S. Dist. 57205, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2024) (holding NFT digital platform is a VTSP subject to the VPPA); *Aldana v. GameStop, Inc.*, No. 22-CV-7063-LTS, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29496, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2024) (holding video game seller is a VTSP); *Sellers v. Bleacher Report, Inc.*, No. 23-cv-00368-SI, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131579, at *15-18 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2023) (VPPA sufficiently applied to sports news website); *Jackson v. Fandom, Inc.*, No. 22-cv-04423-JST, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125531, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2023) (VPPA applies to gaming and entertainment website); *Louth v. NFL*, No. 1:21-cv-00405-MSM-PAS, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163706, at *11-12 (D.R.I. Sep. 12, 2022) (holding VPPA applied to NFL’s videos accessible through mobile app).

¹⁰ See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3).

1 an ordinary person to identify a specific individual’s video-watching behavior—here,
2 Purchasers’ Personal Video Information.

3 31. Congress made clear that the harm to individuals impacted by VPPA violations
4 occurs the moment, and each time, a Purchaser’s Personal Video Information is shared.

5 32. The VPPA requires that any consent to protected disclosures must be in a form
6 that is “separate and distinct” from other legal and financial obligations, that such consent be
7 informed and written, and that such consent be given prior to any disclosures. See 18 U.S.C. §
8 2710(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

9 33. The VPPA covers “prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual
10 materials,”¹¹ and Congress intended that to include a broad category of audio-visual materials,
11 including “laser discs, open-reel movies, or CDI technology,” digitally streamed “video clips,”
12 and video game cut scenes. See *Aldana*, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29496, at *17-18, 19.

13 1. Video Games as Audio-Visual Materials

14 34. Video games contain “cut scenes”¹² and are designed to “keep players immersed
15 in the game world by allowing them to follow a clear narrative.”¹³ A cut scene is a pre-recorded,
16 non-interactive audio-visual sequence embedded within a video game.

17 35. “Narrative storytelling has become more and more common in video games . . .
18 [and] [u]sing cinematic techniques and principles has helped game developers enhance
19 gameplay experience for these kinds of games.”¹⁴

20 36. As early as 1981, laser discs “permit[ted] the viewer to not only manipulate the
21 programming, but to interact with the material – play games, take quizzes, adjust pacing and
22

23 ¹¹ See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4).

24 ¹² Cut scenes, also called cinematics, full motion videos, or interactive events, exist in several formats, including
25 live action video, pre-rendered cut scenes, and real-time cut scenes. Each method makes use of pre-scripted events,
and audio and video materials stored within a game’s files. See David ‘Ryatta’ Wyatt, *The Art of Cutscenes*,
INMOTION GAMING, <http://www.inmotiongaming.com/the-art-of-cutscenes/> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

26 ¹³ *Game Development Meets Filmmaking: Cinematography in Video Games*, ACAD. OF ART UNIV. BLOG (Feb. 21
2020), <https://blog.academyart.edu/game-development-meets-filmmaking-cinematography-in-video-games/> (last
visited Mar. 18, 2026).

¹⁴ *Id.*

1 repeat sections as desired.”¹⁵ VHS tapes could also contain interactive content, like the
2 television series “Captain Power and the Soldiers of the Future,” which used “video game
3 technology” to create an interactive experience, emitting “a signal, encoded in the television
4 film, that both activates and responds to light rays emitted by the toy – a jet aircraft with a pistol
5 grip – when the user pulls the trigger.”¹⁶

6 37. By the mid-1980s, Philips and Sony announced the development of a new video
7 game medium based on the CD and CD-ROM technology.¹⁷ This new format, called Compact-
8 Disc Interactive, or CD-I, was developed to store larger volumes of combined audio, video, and
9 computer graphics on a compact disc.¹⁸

10 38. By 1991, Philips introduced the Philips CDI 910, which “play[ed] cinema-quality
11 computer games, educational programs, movies, and other multimedia products that combine
12 video, audio, and text features in an interactive rather than a play-only mode.”¹⁹ The Philips
13 CDI 910 played games like “Voyeur,” for example, which was “a kind of high-tech version of
14 Clue,” allowing Users to “make decisions for characters and even change the outcome of the
15 mystery.”²⁰

16 39. Sony unveiled its own console, the “PlayStation,” which used a CD-ROM drive
17 to “play videogames as well as other forms of interactive entertainment, as was considered
18 important at the time.”²¹

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22 ¹⁵ Myron Berger, *High-Tech Equipment Comes of Age*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1981.

¹⁶ Sandra Salmans, *The Interactive World of Toys and Television*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1987.

¹⁷ See *Videodiscs in Healthcare: A Guide to the Industry*, THE MEDICALDISC REPORTER (1990), archived at
23 <https://tinyurl.com/44ypcaht> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

¹⁸ See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SCIENCE VOL 50, SUPPLEMENT 13 (1992), archived at (last
24 visited Mar. 18, 2026).

¹⁹ Patrick Oster, *Philips’s Multimedia Makeover; Dutch Electronics Firm Escapes Crisis, but Can It Compete
25 Globally?*, WASH. PO. (Oct. 26, 1994) archived at <https://tinyurl.com/4xwnausj> (last visited March 18, 2026).

²⁰ David Elrich, *Interactive Video: Armchair Activities*, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 1993) archived at
26 <https://nyti.ms/3Wp2wkZ> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

²¹ IGN Staff, *History of the PlayStation: The greatest story ever told*, IGN (updated June 21, 2012 3:22pm EDT),
archived at <https://tinyurl.com/25245e9t> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

1 40. These technologies blurred the line between video games and movies, as “more
2 and more movies look and sound like video games, and . . . more and more video games look
3 and sound like movies”²²

4 41. The advancement of these technologies has also opened the door for actors to
5 take a greater part in a video game’s narrative, with game developers using performance capture
6 technology to record and translate actors’ movements and facial expressions,²³ in addition to
7 traditional acting performances.²⁴

8 42. In the episode “How Cinematic Cutscenes in Video Games are Made” of “A
9 Game Development Podcast,” which is produced by Massive Entertainment, Cinematic
10 Animator Soo Kang notes the basic purpose of a cinematic animator is “responsible for making
11 the visual story telling of the game exciting, inspirational, fun, engaging, making sure that what
12 you’re seeing, on screen, the story telling, helps you progress with your gameplay as well . . .
13 but just in general just fun to watch while you’re sitting and taking a little break from gameplay
14”²⁵

15 43. Soo Kang highlights the similarities between modern game cinematic production
16 and film animation production: “[I]t just happened that I got my job in gaming industry first,
17 but it wasn’t too far off from what I learned about film animation because it was cinematic
18 animation, . . . as opposed to game play animation for example . . . so they were not too far
19 off.”²⁶

20 _____
21 ²² Vincent Canby, *Are Video Games About to Zap the Action Movie?*, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 1983) archived at
<https://tinyurl.com/5fv5s6v3> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

22 ²³ See Anton Söderhäll, *Tracing the past, present, and future of game cinematics*, GAMES INDUSTRY (Jan. 25, 2022)
<https://www.gamesindustry.biz/tracing-the-past-present-and-future-of-game-cinematics> (last visited Mar. 18,
2026).

23 ²⁴ See Adam Sutton, *Videogame Voice Acting: So Bad, It’s Good*, IGN (June 14, 2012 1:29 PM EDT)
<https://www.ign.com/articles/2011/03/04/videogame-voice-acting-so-bad-its-good> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026; Jesse
24 Schedeen, *Cyberpunk 2077, Keanu Reeves and 12 Other Movie Stars Who Made the Jump to Video Games*, IGN
(Jan. 14, 2020 1:25 AM EDT) [https://www.ign.com/articles/2019/06/11/cyberpunk-2077-keanu-reeves-and-12-](https://www.ign.com/articles/2019/06/11/cyberpunk-2077-keanu-reeves-and-12-other-movie-stars-who-made-the-jump-to-video-games)
25 [other-movie-stars-who-made-the-jump-to-video-games](https://www.ign.com/articles/2019/06/11/cyberpunk-2077-keanu-reeves-and-12-other-movie-stars-who-made-the-jump-to-video-games) (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

26 ²⁵ Massive Entertainment – A Ubisoft Studio, *How Cinematic Cutscenes in Video Games are Made | A Game
Development Podcast*, YOUTUBE (Nov. 23, 2022), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVQgcCZLjek> (starting at
1:34) (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

²⁶ *Id.* (starting at 6:22).

1 44. Soo Kang went on to note that the difference between film and cinematic
 2 animation was not big because she was “applying the same learnings of the cinematic scene in
 3 the film, just in the game . . . maybe the transition is different . . . but, like, it wasn’t, it didn’t
 4 feel like I was starting from or reset from zero[.]”²⁷

5 45. These advancements in game production were enabled by the technical
 6 advancements in the mediums used to store video games. Today, video games are typically
 7 manufactured using 100GB Blu-ray discs, the same audio-visual material used for movies.²⁸
 8 Video games are also made available for download, with similar file sizes.²⁹

9 **B. The Federal Wiretap Act**

10 46. The Wiretap Act, as amended through the 1986 Electronic Communications
 11 Privacy Act (“ECPA”), provides a private right of action for private intrusions as though they
 12 were government intrusions.³⁰

13 47. In passing the ECPA, Congress was concerned about technological
 14 advancements, such as “large-scale mail operations, computer-to-computer data transmissions,
 15 cellular and cordless telephones, paging devices, and video conferencing.”³¹

16 48. As a result, the ECPA primarily focused on two types of computer services,
 17 which were prominent in the 1980s: (i) electronic communications, such as email between users;

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 20 ²⁷ *Id.* (starting at 6:55).

21 ²⁸ Chaim Gartenberg, *Sony confirms PlayStation 5 name, holiday 2020 release data*, THE VERGE (Oct. 8, 2019)
 22 (“[T]he PS5 will use standard 100GB Blu-ray discs—Sony had previously confirmed that the console will offer a
 23 disc drive—but all games will have to be installed in the internal SSD this time around.”), available at
 24 <https://tinyurl.com/3z9spd9x> (last visited March 18, 2026); see also Samuel Tolbert, *Can you use physical discs on*
 25 *PS5?*, ANDROID CENTRAL (Dec. 1, 2020) (“Cerny also confirmed that PS5 games are going to ship on 100GB Blu-
 26 ray discs.”), available at <https://tinyurl.com/uchzpv9> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

27 ²⁹ As an example, *Avatar: Frontiers of Pandora*, a game from video game developer Ubisoft, requires a minimum of
 28 90GBs of storage. See *Avatar: Frontiers of Pandora – Standard Edition*, UBISOFT,
 29 https://store.ubisoft.com/us/avatar--frontiers-of-pandora/60c30ca40d253c1914049e93.html?lang=en_US (last
 30 visited Mar. 18, 2026).

31 ³⁰ Hayden Driscoll, *Wiretapping the Internet: Analyzing the Application of the Federal Wiretap Act’s Party*
 32 *Exception Online*, 29 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 187, 192 (2022),
 33 <https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1541&context=crsj> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

34 ³¹ Senate Rep. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986).

1 and (ii) remote computing services, such as cloud storage or third-party processing of data and
2 files.³²

3 49. An ECPA claim requires a showing that a person or entity “(1) intentionally (2)
4 intercepted, endeavored to intercept or procured another person to intercept or endeavor to
5 intercept (3) the contents of (4) an electronic communication, (5) using a device.”³³

6 50. “Interception” is defined as “aural or other acquisition of the contents of any
7 wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
8 device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).

9 51. An “electronic communication” is defined as “any transfer of signs, signals,
10 writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
11 wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical system that affects interstate or
12 foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).

13 52. The “paramount objective of the [ECPA] is to protect effectively the privacy of
14 communications.” *Joffe v. Google*, 746 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2013).

15 53. The ECPA “protects wire, oral, and electronic communications while those
16 communications are being made, are in transit, and when they are stored on computers.”³⁴

17 54. Courts consistently hold that to violate the ECPA, an interception must be
18 “contemporaneous” with the communication. *See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance*
19 *Co.*, 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003); *Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. Secret Service*, 36 F.3d 457,
20 460 (5th Cir. 1994); *Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.*, 302 F.3d 868, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2002);
21 *U.S. v. Steiger*, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047 (11th Cir. 2003).

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25 ³² *In re Zynga Privacy Litig.*, 750 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014).

26 ³³ *R.C. v. Walgreen Co.*, 733 F. Supp. 3d 876, 900 (C.D. Ca. 2024) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.).

³⁴ *Bureau of Justice Assistance U.S. Department of Justice, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)*,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523, BUREAU OF JUST., [https://bj.a.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-
liberties/authorities/statutes/1285](https://bj.a.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1285) (last visited Mar. 19, 2025)

1 55. The “unauthorized duplication and forwarding of unknowing users’ information”
2 is among the most common methods of impermissible intrusion. *In re Facebook Inc. Internet*
3 *Tracking Litig.*, 956 F.3d 589, 608 (9th Cir. 2020).

4 **C. The California Invasion of Privacy Act**

5 56. CIPA was enacted in 1967 for the expressly stated purpose “to protect the right
6 of privacy of the people of [California].”³⁵ The California legislators were concerned about
7 emergent technologies that allowed for the “eavesdropping upon private communications,”
8 believing such technologies “created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties
9 and cannot be tolerated in a free and civilized society.”³⁶

10 57. CIPA is regularly recognized as California’s analog to the Federal Wiretap Act,
11 comprised of the same general elements and protect against the same general harms.

12 58. The California Legislature passed CIPA after finding and “declar[ing] that
13 advances in science and technology have led to the development of new devices and techniques
14 for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private communications and that the invasion of privacy
15 resulting from the continual and increasing use of such devices and techniques has created a
16 serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and cannot be tolerated in a free and
17 civilized society.” Cal. Penal Code § 630.

18 59. To protect people’s privacy, legislators broadly protected wired and aural
19 communications being sent to or received from California.³⁷ Notably, for wired
20 communications, California set out to prohibit (i) intentional wiretapping or (ii) willful attempts
21 to learn the contents of wired communications, (iii) attempts to use or transmit information
22 obtained through wiretapping, or (iv) aiding, agreeing with, employing, or conspiring with any
23 person(s) to unlawfully do, permit, or cause the preceding three prongs³⁸

24 _____
25 ³⁵ Cal. Penal Code § 630.

26 ³⁶ *Id.*

³⁷ Cal. Penal Code § 631-32.

³⁸ *Mastel v. Miniclip SA*, 549 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (citing *Tavernetti v. Superior Ct.*, 22 Cal. 3d 187, 192 (1978)).

1 60. CIPA attaches liability to any person who, willfully and without the consent of
2 all parties to a communication, attempts to read or to learn the contents or meaning of any
3 message or communication while it is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is
4 being sent from, or received at any place within California.³⁹

5 61. CIPA looks to whether a user had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and courts
6 analyzing the expectation of privacy look to the sensitivity of the data at issue. *See In re*
7 *Facebook Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.*, 956 F.3d at 608. Legally protected or sensitive data have
8 heightened requirements that demand more rigorous notice before intercepting.

9 62. CIPA also prohibits the installation of a “pen register” or a “trap and trace device”
10 without first obtaining a court order.⁴⁰

11 **D. The Florida Security of Communications Act**

12 63. Similar to the federal Wiretap and CIPA, the Florida Legislature passed the
13 Florida Security of Communications Act (“FSCA”), Fla. Stat. § 934.01, et seq., after finding
14 that “[i]n order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications, to protect the
15 integrity of court and administrative proceedings, and to prevent the obstruction of intrastate
16 commerce, it is necessary for the Legislature to . . . prohibit any unauthorized interception of
17 such communications”⁴¹

18 64. The Florida Legislature further found that in order “[t]o safeguard the privacy of
19 innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral communications when none of the parties to
20 the communication has consented to the interception should be allowed only when authorized
21 by a court of competent jurisdiction and should remain under the control and supervision of the
22 authorizing court.”⁴²

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³⁹ Cal. Penal Code § 631(a).

⁴⁰ See Cal. Penal Code § 638.51.

⁴¹ Fla. Stat. § 934.01(1).

⁴² Fla. Stat. § 934.01(4).

1 65. The FSCA “was modeled after [the federal Wiretap Act]” and “substantially
2 follows the same language.”⁴³ Notably, the Florida Supreme Court has held that the FSCA
3 “evinces a greater concern for the protection of one’s privacy interests” than the federal Wiretap
4 Act and that it is “instructive to consult the legislative history of the federal act, as well as cases
5 decided thereunder, for guidance on” interpreting the FSCA.⁴⁴

6 66. Prior to 1974, “the [FSCA], like its federal counterpart, permitted the interception
7 of defined wire or oral communications when one party to the communication gave consent.⁴⁵
8 However, the FSCA was amended in 1974 “to require *all parties* to a defined wire or oral
9 communication to give prior consent.”⁴⁶

10 67. The 1974 amendment “was a policy decision by the Florida legislature to allow
11 each party to a conversation to have an expectation of privacy from interception by another party
12 to the conversation.”⁴⁷

13 68. Thus, “[t]he [Florida] Legislature has determined as a matter of state public
14 policy that the right of any caller to the privacy of his conversation is of greater societal value
15 than the interest served by permitting eavesdropping or wiretapping.’ Hence, the Florida act
16 evinces a greater concern for the protection of one’s privacy interests in a conversation than does
17 the federal act.”⁴⁸

18 69. Further mirroring the development of its federal counterpart, two years after
19 Congress amended the Wiretap Act via the 1986 enactment of the ECPA, “[t]he Florida
20 legislature substantially revised chapter 934 in 1988 to conform with the federal provisions
21 regarding the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications.”⁴⁹

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24 ⁴³ *Mozo v. State*, 632 So. 2d 623, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

25 ⁴⁴ *Id.* (citing *State v. Tsavaris*, 394 So. 2d 418, 422 (Fla. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, *Dean v. State*, 478 So. 2d
38 (Fla. 1985)).

26 ⁴⁵ *State v. Tsavaris*, 394 So. 2d at 422.

⁴⁶ *Id.* (emphasis in original).

⁴⁷ *Id.* (quoting *Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp.*, 351 So. 2d 723, 726-27 (Fla. 1977)).

⁴⁸ *Id.* (quoting *State v. Walls*, 356 So. 2d 294, 296 (Fla. 1978)) (internal citation omitted).

⁴⁹ *State v. Jackson*, 650 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 1995).

1 70. The Florida Legislature added electronic communications to chapter 934 of the
2 FSCA to address the growing need for protection of unauthorized interception of electronic
3 communications arising from the proliferation of digital communication devices such as cellular
4 telephones and pagers.⁵⁰

5 71. The purview of the FSCA's protection of electronic communications extends to
6 emails, digital instant messages, and the like. Indeed, "[t]he clear intent of the Legislature in
7 enacting section 934.03 was to make it illegal for a person to intercept wire, oral, or electronic
8 communications" and "it is beyond doubt" that emails, digital chat conversations, and/or instant
9 messages are electronic communications protected by the FSCA.⁵¹

10 **E. How Websites Function**

11 72. Websites are hosted on servers, in the sense that their files are stored on and
12 accessed from servers. Websites are, in part, "run" on a user's internet browser, as the browser
13 loads and processes the website's code to display the webpage.

14 73. Websites are a collection of webpages. A webpage is essentially a document
15 containing text written in HyperText Markup Language (HTML) code.⁵²

16 74. Each webpage has a unique address, and two webpages cannot be stored at the
17 same address.⁵³

18 75. When a user navigates to a webpage (by entering a URL address directly or
19 clicking a hyperlink containing the address), that user's browser contacts the DNS (Domain
20 Name System) server, which translates the web address of that website into a unique IP (Internet
21 Protocol) address.⁵⁴

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23 ⁵⁰ *Id.*

⁵¹ *O'Brien v. O'Brien*, 899 So. 2d 1133, 1135-36 (2005).

24 ⁵² *What is the difference between webpage, website, web server, and search engine?*, MOZILLA,
25 [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
US/docs/Learn/Common_questions/Web_mechanics/Pages_sites_servers_and_search_engines](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Learn/Common_questions/Web_mechanics/Pages_sites_servers_and_search_engines) (last visited Mar.
18, 2026).

26 ⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ *How the web works*, MOZILLA, [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
US/docs/Learn/Getting_started_with_the_web/How_the_Web_works](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Learn/Getting_started_with_the_web/How_the_Web_works) (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).


1 76. An IP address is “a unique address that identifies a device on the Internet or a
2 local network.”⁵⁵ Essentially, an IP address is:

3 The identifier that allows information to be sent between devices on a network:
4 they contain location information and make devices accessible for
5 communication. The internet needs a way to differentiate between different
6 computers, routers, and websites. IP addresses provide a way of doing so and form
7 an essential part of how the internet works.⁵⁶

8 77. When a user’s browser navigates to a webpage, it sends an HTTP request to the
9 server identified by the webpage’s IP address. This request is for the specific resource located at
10 the URL. If the server fulfills this request, it issues an HTTP response, which includes the status
11 of the request and, typically, the requested content. This content is then transmitted in small
12 chunks, known as data packets, and reassembled into the complete webpage by the user’s
13 browser upon arrival.⁵⁷

14 78. This Request URL includes a domain name and path, which identify the specific
15 content being accessed on a website and its location within the website’s structure.

16 79. The Request URL typically contains parameters. Parameters are values added to
17 a URL to transmit data to the recipient, prefaced by a question mark to signal the use of
18 parameters. Parameters direct a web server to provide additional context-sensitive services,⁵⁸ as
19 depicted below:



20 *Figure 1 - Mozilla's diagram of a URL, including parameters*⁵⁹

21 80. Website owners or web developers choose and manage the URLs for their
22 websites.

23 _____
24 ⁵⁵ *What is an IP Address – Definition and Explanation*, KASPERSKY, <https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/definitions/what-is-an-ip-address> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

25 ⁵⁶ *Id.*

26 ⁵⁷ *Id.*


⁵⁸ To see examples of how Defendant used parameters to provide additional information here, *see, infra*, Section C(2).

⁵⁹ *What is a URL?*, MOZILLA, https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Learn/Common_questions/What_is_a_URL (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

1 81. URL encoding is an essential process to ensure that data is safely transmitted via
 2 URLs. URL encoding converts characters into a format that can be transmitted over the
 3 Internet.⁶⁰ For example, URLs cannot contain spaces; URL encoding normally replaces a space
 4 with a plus (+) sign or with %20.

5 82. The American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) was designed
 6 in the early 1960s as a standard character set for computers and electronic devices.⁶¹ Today,
 7 UTF-8 is the Internet's most common character encoding.⁶²

8 83. URL decoding is the process of URL encoding in reverse so that the URL is in a
 9 more readable format.⁶³ To demonstrate:



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15 *Figure 2 – Demonstrating URL encoding and decoding*⁶⁴

16 84. Similarly, parameters and metadata can be parsed and separated into easily
 17 reviewed, searchable formats.

18 85. After sending the Request URL, and after the server responds to the Request
 19 URL, the user's browser assembles the packets sent by the server back into the HTML code of
 20 the webpage, which is then processed by the user's browser, as it arrives,⁶⁵ and "rendered" into

21
22 ⁶⁰ *Id.*

⁶¹ *HTML ASCII Reference*, W3 SCHOOLS, https://www.w3schools.com/charsets/ref_html_ascii.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

⁶² *UTF-8*, MOZILLA, <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Glossary/UTF-8> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

⁶³ *What IS URL Decoding and URL Encoding?*, GOCHYU (Oct. 18, 2020), <https://gochyu.com/blog/url-encode-decode> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

⁶⁴ Viraj Shetty, *URL Encoding in a few minutes*, YOUTUBE (Sept. 5, 2023), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ru0iCHsmsLc> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

⁶⁵ This processing of webpage data as it arrives is called "parsing," and allows web browsers to convert raw data received over the internet into structured data objects used by the renderer built-in to the browser to create images on the screen. This means that, unless a software command, like a Tracking Tool, is physically last to arrive at a device, it is loaded and executed before the communication has finished being received. See *Populating the page*:

1 a visual display according to the instructions of the HTML code.⁶⁶ This is the visible, and
2 usually interactable, website that most people think of.

3 86. To provide more complex website functionalities, website developers will
4 include more complex commands written in other computer programming languages, such as
5 JavaScript snippets, within the HTML documents.⁶⁷

6 87. Such complex tasks include streaming videos by Users or subscribing to
7 Newsletters/ Digital/Print Magazine, or code used to monitor and report User activity.

8 88. In short, the Internet relies on a constant back-and-forth stream of requests and
9 responses between a user's browser and a website's stored code and data. Importantly, the
10 requests and responses provide a perfect snapshot of everything a user does (or does not do) on
11 a website, and when and how they do it, and with what software and hardware.

12 89. Unbeknownst to Users, as they browse the Website, the Tracking Tools, including
13 third- and first-party cookies, capture and record both incoming and outgoing requests and
14 responses that make up their entire experience on the Website.

15 **II. Woot and the Meta Tracking Pixel**

16 **A. The Meta Pixel as a Tracking Tool**

17 90. Boasting 2.9 billion monthly active users, Facebook is the largest social
18 networking site on the planet.⁶⁸ Facebook is a “real identity platform,”⁶⁹ meaning users are
19 allowed only one account and must share “the name they go by in everyday life.”⁷⁰ To meet that

21 ⁶⁶ *how browsers work,* MOZILLA, https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Learn/Common_questions/What_is_a_URL (last visited Feb. 20, 2026).

22 ⁶⁶ *What is a URL?*, MOZILLA, https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Learn/Common_questions/What_is_a_URL (last visited Sept. 17, 2024).

23 ⁶⁷ *See JavaScript Basics,* MOZILLA, https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Learn/Getting_started_with_the_web/JavaScript_basics (last visited Nov. 18, 2024).

24 ⁶⁸ Sean Burch, *Facebook Climbs to 2.9 Billion Users, Report 29.1 Billion in Q2 Sales*, YAHOO (July 28, 2021), <https://www.yahoo.com/now/facebook-climbs-2-9-billion-202044267.html> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

25 ⁶⁹ Sam Schechner and Jeff Horwitz, *How Many Users Does Facebook Have? The Company Struggles to Figure It Out*, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2021 4:05 PM ET), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-many-users-does-facebook-have-the-company-struggles-to-figure-it-out-11634846701> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

26 ⁷⁰ *Community Standards, Part IV Integrity and Authenticity,* FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/integrity_authenticity (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

1 goal, Facebook requires users, when creating an account, to provide their first and last name,
2 along with their birthday and gender.⁷¹

3 91. Approximately seven-in-ten U.S. citizens have a Facebook profile⁷² – all of
4 whom provided the same personal information to Meta when creating their Facebook profiles.

5 92. Facebook monetizes account holders by selling companies access to their
6 Facebook feeds, including to website owners like Defendant.⁷³

7 93. Facebook’s advertising capabilities are valuable because of its ability to
8 effectively target Users with meaningful or relevant advertising.⁷⁴ Facebook can target Users so
9 effectively because it monitors and analyzes user activity both on and off its site.⁷⁵ This allows
10 Facebook to infer details about Users beyond what Users explicitly disclose, like their
11 “interests,” “behavior,” and “connections.”⁷⁶ Facebook compiles this information into a
12 generalized dataset called “Core Audiences,” which website owners can sort through using
13 highly specific filters and parameters to ensure their targeted advertisements reach Users likely
14 to respond positively.⁷⁷

15 94. Website owners can build “Custom Audiences,”⁷⁸ which enable them to reach
16 “people who have already shown interest in [their] business, whether they’re loyal customers or
17 people who have used [their] app or visited [their] website.”⁷⁹ Meta’s Custom Audience feature
18 enables direct targeting of existing customers and the building of “Lookalike Audiences,” which
19

20 ⁷¹ *Sign Up*, FACEBOOK, <https://www.facebook.com/> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

21 ⁷² Katherine Schaeffer, *5 Facts about how Americans use Facebook, two decades after its launch*, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 2, 2024), <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/02/02/5-facts-about-how-americans-use-facebook-two-decades-after-its-launch/> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

22 ⁷³ Mike Isaac, *Facebook’s profit surges 101 percent on strong ad sales*, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2021), <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/28/business/facebook-q2-earnings.html>. (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

23 ⁷⁴ *About Meta Pixel*, FACEBOOK, <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/742478679120153?id=1205376682832142> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

24 ⁷⁵ *Id.*

25 ⁷⁶ *Audience ad targeting*, META, <https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ad-targeting> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

26 ⁷⁷ *Easier, More Effective Ways to Reach the Right People on Facebook*, FACEBOOK, <https://www.facebook.com/business/news/Core-Audiences> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

⁷⁸ *About custom audiences*, FACEBOOK, <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/744354708981227?id=2469097953376494> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

⁷⁹ *About an events custom audience*, FACEBOOK, <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/366151833804507?id=300360584271273> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

1 “leverages information such as demographics, interests, and behavior from your source audience
2 to find new people who share similar qualities.”⁸⁰ Unlike Core Audiences, Custom Audiences
3 require an advertiser to supply Users’ data to Meta. Website owners can do so through two
4 mechanisms: manually uploading customer contact information in the form of “lists,” or using
5 Meta’s “Business Tools,” which automatically collect and transmit the data.⁸¹

6 95. Here, Defendant made use of Meta’s Business Tools and lists to disclose Users’
7 Sensitive Information to Meta.

8 96. For example, Meta offers the Meta Pixel and the Conversions API (“CAPI”).
9 Where “the Pixel lets you share web events from a web browser[,] . . . the Conversions API lets
10 you share web events directly from your server.”⁸²

11 97. It is important to note that, with trained investigators, some Meta Pixel behavior
12 is observable on a user’s device; investigators and users have no method of determining whether
13 websites make use of CAPI on websites’ servers or what information is collected by the CAPI.

14 98. The Meta Pixel is a piece of code that website owners, like Defendant, can
15 integrate into their websites. Once activated, the Meta Pixel “tracks the people and types of
16 actions they take. . . .”⁸³ When the Meta Pixel captures an action, it sends a record of the action
17 to Meta. After receiving the Pixel transmission sent by a website owner, Meta processes it,
18 analyzes it, and assimilates it into datasets like the Core Audiences and Custom Audiences.

19 99. Because Meta designs the Meta Pixel to be installed onto Users’ browsers, as
20 well as the system receiving the information, it is in complete control of how simple or complex
21 its transmissions appear. For example, Meta requires that website owners encode their Meta
22

23 _____
24 ⁸⁰ *About lookalike audiences*, FACEBOOK,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/164749007013531?id=401668390442328> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

25 ⁸¹ *Create a customer list custom audience*, FACEBOOK,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/170456843145568?id=2469097953376494> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026);.

26 ⁸² *Omni Optimal Technical Setup Guide: Best Practices and Requirements*, FACEBOOK,
<https://developers.facebook.com/documentation/ads-commerce/marketing-api/best-practices/omni-optimal-setup-guide> (last visited Apr. 14, 2026).

⁸³ *Retargeting*, FACEBOOK, <https://www.facebook.com/business/goals/retargeting> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

1 Pixel transmissions using UTF-8, a process that prepares data for transmission across the
2 Internet.

3 100. The Meta Pixel collects and sends all the information needed to identify in a
4 single transmission, including IP addresses.⁸⁴ The Meta Pixel does not require obtaining any
5 additional information from other websites to piece together Users' identities.

6 101. Meta's "Get Started" page further explains how it can identify Users and match
7 them to their Facebook pages: "[The Meta Pixel] relies on Facebook cookies, which enable us
8 to match your website visitors to their respective Facebook User accounts. Once matched, we
9 can tally their actions in the Facebook Ads Manager so you can use the data to analyze your
10 website's conversion flows and optimize your ad campaigns."⁸⁵

11 102. Meta designed the Meta Pixel, as well as the computer system that receives and
12 parses the data that the Meta Pixel intercepts, collects, and transmits to Meta. Meta had total
13 control over the form, function, and complexity of the Request URLs generated through the
14 Meta Pixel, and the data collected and transmitted by the Meta Pixel was as easy or as difficult
15 to read as Meta desired.

16 103. Meta designed the information received via Meta Pixel transmissions so that any
17 ordinary person can read and understand the contents of information shared with Meta.

18 104. Even though some of the information disclosed is technical in nature, any
19 ordinary person can easily surmise what pre-recorded audio-visual materials a person requested
20 or obtained because it directly tracks the name of the pre-recorded audio-visual materials as it
21 appears on the User's screen, as well as that person's FID — an easily identifiable and unique
22 string of numbers tied to the individual.

23 105. Indeed, Meta controlled how this information was transmitted and received. Meta
24 chose to use the most common encoding system to transmit data across the Internet, an encoding
25

26 ⁸⁴ See *Customer Information Parameters*, META, <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/conversions-api/parameters/customer-information-parameters/> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

⁸⁵ *Get Started*, META, <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/meta-pixel/get-started/> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

1 system that common internet browsers can easily decode and parse into easy-to-understand
2 information.

3 106. After receiving the Meta Pixel transmissions, Meta also leveraged the received
4 data to build detailed profiles for targeted advertising based on a consumer’s activities (including
5 purchases), interests, webpage history, searched-for content, behavior, and habits.

6 107. After processing the Meta Pixel-collected data, Meta also makes much of the
7 data available to the website owner through the “Event Manager” tool.⁸⁶

8 108. However, to make use of the Meta Pixel, website operators and/or owners, such
9 as Defendant, must first agree to the Meta Business Tools Terms.

10 109. The Meta Business Tools Terms directly inform website developers who
11 implement the Meta Pixel of how it operates.

12 110. Meta explicitly informs website developers that implement the Meta Pixel that
13 using the Meta Pixel will result in Meta receiving Users’ information “that personally identifies
14 [them] . . .” (“Contact Information”) and information “about [Users] and the actions that they
15 take on your websites . . .” (“Event Data”).⁸⁷ The terms also warn website developers that
16 Facebook will “process the Contact Information solely to match the Contact Information
17 against” FIDs, “as well as to combine those [FIDs] with corresponding Event Data.”⁸⁸

18 111. Meta also requires website developers that implement the Meta Pixel to
19 “represent and warrant that [they] . . . have all the necessary rights and permissions and a lawful
20 basis (in compliance with all applicable laws, regulations and industry guidelines) for the
21 disclosure and use of Business Tool Data.”⁸⁹

22
23
24 ⁸⁶ *About Meta Events Manager*, FACEBOOK,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/898185560232180?id=1205376682832142> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

25 ⁸⁷ *Meta Business Tools Terms, Section 1(a)(i)-(ii)*, FACEBOOK,
26 https://www.facebook.com/legal/businessstech?paipv=0&eav=AfY4CZdRHnQNL2-VtXBCcMUcg-6J-5jU8AL4hOLVikhAWi-SbNmA4QuXlc6yyk877eY&_rdi (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

⁸⁸ *Id.* § 2(a)(i)(1).

⁸⁹ *Id.* § 1(e).

1 112. Additionally, Meta requires website developers that implement the Meta Pixel to
2 “represent and warrant that [they] will not share Business Tool Data with [Meta] that . . . includes
3 . . . categories of sensitive information (including any information defined as sensitive under
4 applicable laws, regulations and applicable industry guidelines).”⁹⁰

5 113. In short, Meta explicitly describes that the Meta Pixel combines users’
6 identifying information with their activity on websites to build marketing profiles and, as a
7 result, that websites should not share sensitive information using the Meta Pixel.

8 114. Despite Meta’s warnings, website owners ultimately have control over what
9 actions—or, as Meta calls it, “events”—the Meta Pixel will monitor on websites. These events,
10 in turn, determine what data is collected, including the website’s query string parameters,
11 metadata, and what pages a visitor views.⁹¹

12 115. Defendant, as a website owner, can widen or narrow the scope of information
13 transmitted or received by Users interacting with the Website and, as a result, captured by Meta.
14 Defendant also has some ability to limit how Meta Pixel identifies Users through cookies.

15 116. While Defendant’s Website has configured the Meta Pixel to automatically
16 collect “HTTP Headers” and “Pixel-specific Data,” Defendant chooses which events to monitor
17 and which parameters and metadata are collected and sent to Meta.⁹²

18 117. HTTP Headers include “IP addresses, information about the web browser, page
19 location, document, referrer, and data potentially identifying persons using the website.”⁹³ Pixel-
20 specific Data includes “the Pixel ID and cookie[s],”⁹⁴ which can also identify persons using the
21 website.

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23
24 ⁹⁰ *Id.* § 1(h).

25 ⁹¹ See *Meta Pixel, Accurate Event Tracking, Advanced*, FACEBOOK, <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-pixel/advanced/> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026); see also *Best practices for Meta Pixel setup*, FACEBOOK, <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/218844828315224?id=1205376682832142> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

26 ⁹² *Meta Pixel*, FACEBOOK, <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-pixel/> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

⁹³ *Id.*

⁹⁴ *Id.*

1 118. Website owners can configure the Meta Pixel to track events other than Meta’s
 2 menu of “standard events,” which contain events that can track what content a visitor views or
 3 purchases.⁹⁵ A website owner can also create their own “custom events,” allowing them to track
 4 designated user activity and data through events programmed specifically for that purpose on
 5 the advertiser’s website.⁹⁶

6 119. The Meta Pixel activates when one of the events being monitored by a website
 7 occurs, such as loading a web page or a specified action, such as clicking a button.

8 120. Once the Meta Pixel activates, it copies relevant information from the
 9 communication between the user and website, such as URLs, user activity, search terms,
 10 metadata, query string parameters, and Pixel-specific Data, including cookies. The Meta Pixel
 11 then bundles that information together and transmits that copied bundle to Meta through a
 12 “GET” or “POST” HTTP Request.

13 121. The Request URL generated by the Meta Pixel contains much of this information
 14 as parameters, while cookies are included in the HTTP Headers. *See Figure 13.*

15 **B. Woot Implemented the Meta Pixel on the Website.**

16 122. To activate and employ the Meta Pixel, a website owner must first sign up for a
 17 Facebook account, where adding the Meta Pixel to the website owner’s “business portfolio”
 18 provides the most utility for using the Meta Pixel.⁹⁷ For instance, business portfolios can: (i)
 19 create and utilize more simultaneous Pixels, (ii) manage multiple Facebook Pages, Instagram
 20 accounts, ad accounts, and catalogs from a centralized interface, (iii) access and manage
 21 multiple parties (which can then be given specific levels of access, including more easily
 22 revoking access to ex-employees), (iv) post or analyze data analytics collected from Facebook
 23

24 _____
 25 ⁹⁵ *Specifications for Meta Pixel standard events,* FACEBOOK,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/402791146561655?id=1205376682832142> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

26 ⁹⁶ *About standard and custom website events,* FACEBOOK,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/964258670337005?id=1205376682832142> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

⁹⁷ *How to set up your Meta Pixel with a business portfolio,* FACEBOOK,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/314143995668266?id=1205376682832142> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

1 pages or Instagram accounts, (v) run ads businesses across Facebook and Instagram, and (vi)
2 create and manage shops across Facebook and Instagram.⁹⁸

3 123. To add an operational Meta Pixel to a website, the website owner or operator
4 must take several affirmative steps, including naming the Meta Pixel during the creation and
5 setup of the Meta Pixel.⁹⁹

6 124. The website owner or operator must tell Meta which website events it wants to
7 track, and Meta then returns the corresponding Meta Pixel code for the website owner or
8 operator to incorporate into its website.

9 125. Moreover, Meta notes that “[d]evelopers and marketers can *optionally choose* to
10 send additional information about the visit through Custom Data events.”¹⁰⁰

11 126. Specifically, Defendant chose to send to Meta the names of video games
12 purchased on the Website that contain cut scenes, the URL of the purchased video game (which
13 clearly identified the purchased video game by title and internal Content ID), and the Purchaser’s
14 FID. Defendant made a conscious decision to share Purchasers’ Personal Video Information with
15 Meta.

16 127. Once the Meta Pixel is installed, the website operator assigns access to the Meta
17 Pixel to specific people for management purposes,¹⁰¹ and must connect the Meta Pixel to a
18 Facebook Ad account.¹⁰²

19 128. After following these steps, a website operator can start capturing and sharing
20 information using the Meta Pixel.

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23 ⁹⁸ *About business portfolios*, FACEBOOK, <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/486932075688253> (last visited
Mar. 19, 2026).

24 ⁹⁹ *Id.*; see also Ivan Mana, *How to Set Up & Install the Facebook Pixel*, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2022)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ynTNs5FAUm8> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

25 ¹⁰⁰ *Meta Pixel*, META, <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/meta-pixel/> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026) (emphasis
added).

26 ¹⁰¹ *Add people to your Meta Pixel in Meta Business Suite or Business Manager*, FACEBOOK,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/279059996069252?id=2042840805783715> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

¹⁰² *Add an ad account to a Meta Pixel in Meta Business Manager*, FACEBOOK,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/622772416185967> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

1 129. To be clear, the Meta Pixel cannot be placed on a website solely by Meta. It must
2 be placed directly by or on behalf of the site owner. Woot did just this.

3 **C. The Facebook ID Allows an Ordinary Person to Identify a Purchaser and**
4 **Their Video Game Purchases**

5 130. Meta maintains vast amounts of data on each of its account holders, like Plaintiffs
6 and the putative Class Members.

7 131. In addition to the information every user is required to provide to Meta when
8 creating an account (including first and last name, date of birth, gender, email address and/or
9 phone number, and password), Meta also possesses and has access to all of the information every
10 user has ever posted on his or her Facebook profile, profile views, likes, comments, shared
11 and/or reposts, event invitations, event RSVPs, Facebook messages, “check-ins,” and much,
12 much more.

13 132. This data is not limited to only what a person does on Facebook but also includes
14 all records relating to when a user is tracked on off-Facebook websites, such as Plaintiffs’,
15 Website Users’, and Purchasers’ interactions with the Website.

16 133. The Meta Pixel continuously adds data from new interactions to the historical
17 profiles Meta maintains on individuals with Facebook profiles (and even for a time after
18 Facebook account holders delete their Facebook profiles).

19 134. Crucial to the Meta Pixel’s effectiveness is its ability to associate a user’s
20 interactions on websites across the internet with that specific user’s unique Facebook profile.
21 This is made possible, most notably, through the FID.

22 135. An FID—commonly known as the “c_user field—is a unique and persistent
23 identifier that Facebook assigns to each user. It contains a series of numbers used to identify a
24 specific profile, as depicted below:


25 26

Figure 3 - Sample FID number of test account created by Plaintiffs’ counsel in a prior investigation into the Meta Pixel, captured by a Meta Pixel event

1 136. An FID can be used by anyone to easily identify a Facebook account holder by
2 simply appending the FID to www.facebook.com (e.g., [www.facebook.com/\[FID_here\]](http://www.facebook.com/[FID_here])).

3 137. Meta itself publishes explanations and help center materials confirming that an
4 FID is a string of numbers that links to a specific profile and can be entered into the URL bar to
5 navigate directly to that profile. Ordinary internet users – roughly seven-in-ten Americans – are
6 among Facebook’s account holder base and regularly encounter URLs and learn from
7 Facebook’s own help pages on how to find and use FIDs.¹⁰³

8 138. A simple search for “what is a c_user cookie” leads one to learn that the string of
9 numbers is the FID of the user, demonstrating that even non-technical internet users can, without
10 specialized knowledge, discover and apply an FID to locate a given Facebook profile.



24 *Figure 4 – Google AI answer to search for “what is the c_user cookie”*

26 ¹⁰³ Katherine Schaeffer, *5 Facts about how Americans use Facebook, two decades after its launch*, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 2, 2024), <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/02/02/5-facts-about-how-americans-use-facebook-two-decades-after-its-launch/> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

1 139. A subsequent Google search for “facebook user id” reveals that the URL of a
2 Facebook profile is facebook.com followed by the FID.

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Google facebook user id

All Images Videos Short videos News Shopping Forums More ▾

◆ AI Overview

A Facebook User ID is a unique string of numbers that identifies a specific user's profile within the Facebook ecosystem. It's different from a Facebook username, which is the web address for the profile (e.g., facebook.com/yourname). User IDs are used internally by Facebook for various purposes, including account management, data organization, and security. ⓘ

Here's how to find your Facebook User ID:

1. Check your Profile URL:

Desktop:

Go to your Facebook profile. The URL in your browser's address bar will look something like this: <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=123456789101112>. The ID is the string of numbers after "id=". ⓘ

Mobile:

Open Facebook on your mobile device, tap your profile picture, and navigate to "Settings & Privacy" > "Settings" > "Accounts Center" > "Profiles". Then, tap on the profile and select "Username". ⓘ

2. Using Facebook's Help Center:

- You can find your user ID within the Facebook app or website by navigating to Settings and Privacy, then Settings, then Your Activity, then Apps and Websites. Choose the app or game you're interested in, and your user ID will be listed there. ⓘ

AI responses may include mistakes. Export Save Like Share

23 *Figure 5 – Google AI answer to search for “facebook user id”*

24 140. Even simpler, with the rise in general artificial intelligence agents such as
25 ChatGPT, anyone with an internet connection can use tools to decipher computer code, as
26 demonstrated below.

1 Cookie

2 datr=SRz2ZwkqD1MICziMOaV5brBb; sb=axe2Z3ELf4psOISR5g4mAbnw; ps_n=1;

3 c_user=[REDACTED]


4 fr=1pt1CrZUb5GCIKrsE.AWf9w0OWi6U7vLypxV2ASHrQbvGC1HbHs4N2zS9Z_yAtcwFYg

5 hs.BoONEO.AAA.0.0.BoONEO.AWPM8vKpdJ0voFclFNQPsmTNsU; xs=16%3A2Jkg3ou-

6 pgMbfQ%3A2%3A1739986850%3A-1%3A-1%3A%3AAcU9K7MEQJ5AH9t7NzLyUbCqy-

7 P5BBBoaBeHEfV2AVYo; ar_debug=1

8 Figure 6 – Screenshot from a browser’s developer tools of cookies transmitted from a Pixel transmission (c_user redacted)



9 This is a Facebook user ID that corresponds to the person who was logged into Facebook in the browser session when the video was accessed.

10 Can this ID identify the person?

- 11 • Yes, but only within Facebook’s system.
- 12 The c_user value ([REDACTED]) is a unique Facebook user ID tied to an account. If you control this browser session (e.g., it’s your own), you could:
 - 13 • Paste this URL into your browser:
 - 14 [https://www.facebook.com/\[REDACTED\]](https://www.facebook.com/[REDACTED])
 - 15 • It will redirect to the associated profile (if it exists and hasn’t been deleted or made private).

16 Figure 7 – Screenshot from ChatGPT response to query “Identify the person who watched the video” with screenshot of cookies from Figure 18 (c_user redacted)

17 141. To illustrate, appending the FID from Figure 3 to the Facebook URL in a standard internet browser (here, www.facebook.com/100091959850832) will redirect the webpage straight to the Facebook profile associated with the FID, as depicted below:




Figure 8 - Sample result of appending FID of a user to “facebook.com/” being redirected to the user’s profile created by Plaintiffs’ counsel in a prior investigation into the Meta Pixel

142. Thus, when a URL embedding an FID is disclosed – such as by a video tape service provider, any ordinary user who follows that link will be brought directly to the Facebook profile operating under that ID, thereby identifying the person who purchased the pre-recorded audio-visual material and revealing any public details displayed on that profile (e.g., photos, posts, Facebook friends, location, occupation, partner/spouse, educational history, etc.).

143. Importantly, some Facebook profile information – name, gender, profile photo, cover photo, username, user ID (account number), age range, language, and country – is “always public.”¹⁰⁴ No privacy setting on a Facebook account would allow Plaintiffs, or any account holder, to hide this basic information.

¹⁰⁴ Control who can see what you share on Facebook, FACEBOOK, <https://www.facebook.com/help/1297502253597210> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

1 144. An FID identifies an individual with far greater precision than a name alone,
 2 particularly where the name is common or duplicated. For example, while multiple individuals
 3 named “John Smith” may exist in the United States—or even on Facebook—only one account
 4 will correspond to a particular FID. Possession of an FID, therefore, allows identification of a
 5 unique individual with certainty.

6 145. Even if a Facebook profile’s displayed name is a pseudonym, the underlying FID
 7 still furnishes a clear hook by which Tracking Entities can associate specific viewing behavior
 8 with a single, uniquely identified human being.

9 146. Here, for each of Plaintiffs’ interactions on the Website, the Meta Pixel
 10 transmitted those interactions to Meta, which was then able to instantly associate those
 11 interactions with Plaintiffs’ Sensitive Information submitted when creating their accounts, and
 12 with any Sensitive Information ever available on their Facebook profiles through their unique
 13 FIDs.

14 147. Thus, an FID is not an obscure technical ingredient that needs to be combined
 15 with many other opaque identifiers, but instead a readily accessible identifier that ordinary
 16 people can understand and use to connect personal names, profiles, and online activities to the
 17 identifier.

18 **D. The Meta Pixel Employed by Woot Shared Users’ Sensitive Information**

19 148. Defendant added the Meta Pixel to the Website, which it used to invisibly track
 20 Users throughout their use of the Website. The Meta Pixel tracks User activity on web pages by
 21 monitoring events¹⁰⁵ that, when triggered, cause the Meta Pixel to automatically send data,
 22 including Users’ Sensitive Information, directly to Meta.¹⁰⁶ Examples of events utilized by
 23 websites include: (i) a user loading a page with a Pixel installed (the “PageView event”);¹⁰⁷ (ii)
 24


25 ¹⁰⁵ *About Meta Pixel*, FACEBOOK,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/742478679120153?id=1205376682832142> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

26 ¹⁰⁶ *See generally id.*

¹⁰⁷ *Specifications for Meta Pixel standard events*, FACEBOOK,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/402791146561655?id=1205376682832142> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

1 when a user views pre-designated content, like products for sale (the “ViewContent” event);¹⁰⁸
 2 and (iii) the “InitiateCheckout” event (collectively with PageView event, ViewContent event,
 3 the “Pixel Events”).¹⁰⁹ The Website utilizes all three Pixel Events.¹¹⁰

4 149. When a User visited a webpage, including those with pre-recorded audio-visual
 5 materials, a PageView event and a ViewContent Event triggered, transmitting the item’s title
 6 and content ID¹¹¹.






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Figure 9 – Sample webpage showcasing a product

24 ¹⁰⁸ Reference: standard events, FACEBOOK, <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/meta-pixel/reference/> (last visited
 25 Mar. 19, 2026).

¹⁰⁹ *Id.*

¹¹⁰ The presence of Pixel events can be confirmed by using the publicly available and free Meta Pixel Helper tool.
 26 See *About the Meta Pixel Helper*, FACEBOOK, <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/198406697184603?id=1205376682832142> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

¹¹¹ The content ID is a number that is used by Woot to identify a specific product.








Figure 10 – Meta Pixel tracking a User viewing the product from Figure 10 through the “PageView” event






Figure 11 – Facebook Meta Pixel tracking a User viewing the product from Figure 10 through the “ViewContent” event




Figure 12 – The payload from the “ViewContent” event, showing the content ID for the product from Figure 9

150. The PageView event caused the User’s browser to transmit data to Meta identifying the specific product page visited, including the product title contained within the requested URL and the content ID assigned to that product.

1 151. When that same User viewed their shopping cart to initiate the checkout process,
 2 the Meta Pixel triggered an “InitiateCheckout” event that transmitted the same internal content
 3 identifier previously associated with the viewed product.





Figure 13 - InitiateCheckout Meta Pixel event triggered when the User proceeds to checkout




Figure 14 – The payload from the “InitiateCheckout” event, showing the content ID for the product from Figure 9

152. The ViewContent event disclosed the product name and the associated content ID to Meta. The InitiateCheckout event disclosed to Meta that the User is also a Purchaser purchasing a specific product, and identified the product using the previously disclosed Content ID. These two Meta Pixel events allow Meta to discover that a Purchaser is viewing a video game with a title associated with a content ID and subsequently purchasing an item with the same content ID, linking the title to the purchase. In short, the Meta Pixel Events implemented by Defendant allow Meta to ascertain Purchasers’ identities and video game purchases through the c_user cookie, and to identify the products Purchasers are acquiring through the video game product’s webpage URL and content ID.

Information Gathering Timeline




Figure 15 – A graphic demonstrating the purchase information captured by the Meta Pixel

153. When a Purchaser purchased pre-recorded audio-visual materials on the Website while logged into Facebook, the Website compelled a visitor’s browser to transmit to Facebook the c_user cookie, which contained that visitor’s unencrypted FID, along with other cookies like the datr, xs, fr, and ar_debug cookies, as shown in Figure 18 below. The c_user, datr, and fr cookies allowed Meta to link purchases of video games featuring cut scenes to the Facebook user purchasing the pre-recorded audio-visual materials.¹¹² The event data disclosed by Defendant thus permits an ordinary person to identify the Purchaser through these cookies.

¹¹² See Cookie Policy, BMW, <https://bavarianmotorcars.com/en/cookie-policy> (last visited May 20, 2025); See Cookie Policy, BMW, <https://bavarianmotorcars.com/en/cookie-policy> (last visited May 20, 2025); Common cookies and uses, FACEBOOK, [https://www.facebook.com/privacy/policies/cookies/?annotations\[0\]=explanation%2F1_common_cookies_and_uses](https://www.facebook.com/privacy/policies/cookies/?annotations[0]=explanation%2F1_common_cookies_and_uses) (last visited May 20, 2025).

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The image shows two screenshots from a web browser's developer tools. The top screenshot displays the 'Request Headers' tab, showing various headers for a GET request to a Facebook URL. The 'Cookie' header is highlighted with a red box, showing several cookies including 'c_user'. The bottom screenshot displays the 'Cookies' tab, showing a table of request cookies. The 'c_user' cookie is highlighted with a red box in the table.

Name	Value	Domain	Path	Expires	Size	HttpO...	Secure	SameS...	Partiti...	Cross ...	Priority
c_user	[REDACTED]	.faceb...	/	2027-...	21		✓	None			Medium
datr	n2GwaSEqRQ-Aahbys66ZzWAj	.faceb...	/	2027-...	28	✓	✓	None			Medium
fr	15ZHul20nJhkv3AWfdXEyFP6CZZcH6nhg...	.faceb...	/	2026-...	122	✓	✓	None			Medium
ps_n	1	.faceb...	/	2027-...	5	✓	✓	None			Medium
sb	IWGwabdKuad0mJ4bwkz2Hno	.faceb...	/	2027-...	26	✓	✓	None			Medium
xs	4%3AGswhPSn1bEGjtA%3A2%3A1773167025%3A-1%3A-1%3A%3AAcwb4IAVWXAasz2S3R6qocF_B40WAjwrz1GWWAQ	.faceb...	/	2027-...	95	✓	✓	None			Medium

Figure 16 – Cookies attached to Meta Pixel transmission

154. Meta, at a minimum, uses the c_user, datr, and fr cookies to link to FIDs and corresponding Facebook profiles.

155. Meta admits that “[website owners] provide us with information about [their] existing customers and we match this information with Facebook profiles.”¹¹³ The customer lists must contain “‘identifier[s]’ (such as email, phone number, address)”¹¹⁴ so that Meta can

¹¹³ Create a Customer Audience List, FACEBOOK, <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/170456843145568?id=24690979533764> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

¹¹⁴ *Id.*

1 match the lists to “Facebook profiles” and “[website owners] can advertise to [their] customers
2 on Facebook, Instagram, and Audience Network.”¹¹⁵

3 156. While the technical evidence in this case may show the code-based transmission
4 of an FID and a video title, Meta would not need to read or interpret that code manually. Instead,
5 it receives and processes the information through internal systems that automatically extract the
6 meaning of the data, linking a specific user to a specific video, with ease and accuracy.

7 157. Meta maintains an internal user interface that automatically translates incoming
8 Meta Pixel transmissions into readable, plain-text formats. These interfaces allow Meta to view
9 and analyze incoming data in human-understandable terms, such as here, identifying which user
10 watched which video. Although these internal tools are not publicly available, their existence is
11 evidenced by Meta’s technical documentation and operational capabilities, which rely on the
12 ingestion and automated interpretation of Meta Pixel data to serve ads and build user profiles.


13 158. Meta stores this broken-down, incoming Meta Pixel transmission data in its data
14 warehouse, called the “Hive,” and can analyze it to identify data sources and the contents of the
15 transmitted data.¹¹⁶

16 159. Said differently, Meta designed the Meta Pixel transmission and reception
17 capabilities to understand who is sending it data via the Meta Pixel and, further, what the event
18 data means.

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26 ¹¹⁵ *Customer List Custom Audiences, FACEBOOK,*
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/341425252616329?id=24690979533764> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

¹¹⁶ See Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions, *In re Meta Pixel Healthcare*,
No. 3:22-cv-03580-WHO (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2024), ECF No. 740.

1 160. Indeed, even the website operators who implement the Meta Pixel, like
 2 Defendant, have access to dashboards and analytics tools that display Meta Pixel outputs in
 3 clear, non-technical terms.



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12 *Figure 17 – Meta Pixel outputs received from a third party’s Event Manager for illustrative purposes*

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14 161. These tools confirm that both Meta and its business partners interpret the
 15 underlying code using accessible interfaces designed to reveal user behavior in plain English.

16 162. Figure 17 shows, for example, how many PageView events were triggered in a
 17 given time frame, along with the parameters used to better match Users to their Facebook
 18 profiles.¹¹⁷

19 163. The dashboard will inform website operators of their event match quality—the
 20 better the event match quality, the more likely Meta Pixel events are being matched to Facebook
 21 profiles.¹¹⁸

22 164. Defendant, therefore, disclosed PII under the VPPA because the information
 23 transmitted to Meta—including Purchasers’ FIDs and specific pre-recorded audio-visual
 24 material names (i.e., Personal Video Information)—was disclosed in a technical format, but one
 25

26 ¹¹⁷ See *About event match quality*, META, <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/765081237991954?id=818859032317965> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

¹¹⁸ *Id.*

1 that is understood by ordinary people once removed from the technical encoding necessary to
 2 transmit the data. Much like a person does not understand raw radio waves to hear the sounds
 3 carried by the raw radio waves, one still understands the words coming out of the radio once the
 4 signal is received and processed by the radio.

5 **E. Woot Was Told that the Pixel Meta Discloses Users’ Data; Woot Knew**
 6 **Precisely What the Meta Pixel Would Collect and Share**

7 165. When a business applies with Meta to use the Meta Pixel, it is provided with
 8 details about its functionality (site policy).¹¹⁹

9 166. To make use of the Meta Pixel, Defendant agreed to Meta’s Business Tool Terms
 10 (the “Business Terms”).

11 167. The Business Terms inform website owners using Meta’s tracking tools that the
 12 employment of the Meta Pixel will result in data sharing, including with Meta, through the
 13 automatic sharing of Meta Pixel Event Data and Contact Information.¹²⁰

14 168. The Business Terms are transparent that the Event Data and Contact Information
 15 will be processed “... to match the Contact Information against user IDs (“Matched User IDs”),
 16 as well as to combine those user IDs with corresponding Event Data.”¹²¹

17 169. Meta directs parties implementing the Meta Pixel – here, Woot– to encrypt
 18 request information¹²² *before* data can be shared.¹²³

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 21 ¹¹⁹ See *Get Started*, FACEBOOK <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/meta-pixel/get-started> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026) (The Pixel “relies on Facebook cookies, which enable us to match your website visitors to their respective Facebook User accounts. Once matched, we can their actions in the Facebook Ads Manager so you can use the data . . . By default, the Pixel will track URLs visited [and] domains visited . . .”).

22
 23 ¹²⁰ *Meta Business Tools Terms*, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms/businessstools?paipv=0&eav=AfakosFmNyhZJOrkCsGodnMzth_uq6s403DsPEkeiKEyrj7rKyf5_t2I8wFEEUZUJII& rdr (last visited Mar. 19, 2026); see § C(1).

24 ¹²¹ *Id.*

25 ¹²² This contrasts with Facebook’s JavaScript Pixel, which automatically encrypts the data being sent. Woot has specifically chosen the Pixel method which makes Users’ information visible. *See id.*

26 ¹²³ *Meta Business Tools Terms*, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms/businessstools?paipv=0&eav=AfakosFmNyhZJOrkCsGodnMzth_uq6s403DsPEkeiKEyrj7rKyf5_t2I8wFEEUZUJII& rdr (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

1 170. Meta further provides website developers who implement the Meta Pixel, such
2 as Woot, guidance on responsible data handling, and details on how data is acquired, used, and
3 stored, including which information it would be sharing with Meta.

4 171. The Business Terms specifically require website developers who implement the
5 Meta Pixel to represent and warrant that they will not share data that includes “sensitive
6 information (including any information defined as sensitive under applicable laws, regulations,
7 and applicable industry guidelines).”¹²⁴

8 172. Meta educates or reminds website developers who implement the Meta Pixel of
9 their responsibility to inform Meta Pixel users of their websites’ data sharing, and specifically
10 guides website owners to obtain the requisite rights, permissions, or consents before sharing
11 information with any third parties.¹²⁵

12 173. Aside from Meta informing Defendant that it needed “a clear and prominent
13 notice on each web page where [its] Pixels are used[,]” Defendant was also on notice that it must
14 “ensure, in a verifiable manner, that an end user provide[d] all necessary consents before [Woot]
15 use[d] [Meta’s Pixel] to enable the storage of and access to Meta cookies . . . [i]n jurisdictions
16 that require informed consent.”¹²⁶

17 174. As a sophisticated party entering into a business arrangement with another
18 sophisticated party, Woot was on notice of the potential privacy violations that would result from
19 the Website’s use of the Meta Pixel, and ignored Meta’s warnings to safely handle and protect
20 Users’ data and/or to warn Purchasers that the Website would disclose information in a manner
21 that threatened Purchasers’ VPPA-protected Personal Video Information.

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25 ¹²⁴ *Id.*

26 ¹²⁵ *Best practices for privacy and data use for Meta Business Tools*, FACEBOOK,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/363303621411154?id=818859032317965> (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

¹²⁶ *Id.*

1 **III. The Website Lacks Informed, Written Consent Separate and Distinct from Other**
2 **Obligations, Pursuant to the VPPA**

3 175. The Website does not seek nor obtain permission from Purchasers, including
4 Plaintiffs and the Class Members, to share Purchasers' Personal Video Information with
5 Tracking Entities, including Meta.

6 176. To the extent information about any of the Website's data sharing can be located,
7 the language is not (i) presented to Purchasers of the site in a transparent manner, or where it
8 must be viewed by Purchasers; (ii) made available as part of the sign-up process; (iii) offered to
9 Purchasers as checkbox or e-signature field, or as any form of consent; and (iv) presented in
10 terms that sufficiently warn Purchasers that their information, protected by the VPPA, will be
11 shared with Meta.¹²⁷

12 177. Woot's Privacy Policy does not disclose the use of Tracking Tools by the
13 Tracking Entities.¹²⁸ Amazon's Privacy Notice, which Woot links to in its own Privacy Policy,
14 only briefly mentions the use of cookies and does not disclose the use of third-party Tracking
15 Tools.¹²⁹ Amazon's Cookie Notice, which Amazon links to in its Privacy Notice, does disclose
16 the use of Tracking Tools but does not disclose what data they collect.¹³⁰ None of these
17 documents discloses that Meta is one of the Tracking Entities.

18 178. The VPPA has specific requirements for how written and informed consent must
19 be given. Generic references in Defendant's Privacy Policy to the use of cookies and potential
20 third-party data sharing do not equate to the explicit, informed consent required under the VPPA.
21 *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B).

22 179. Consent under the VPPA also "require[s] video tape service providers to request
23 Users' consent to a privacy disclosure that addresses only the use of [Personal Video

24 ¹²⁷ *See Privacy Policy*, WOOT, https://www.woot.com/privacy?ref=w_ngf_pp (last visited Mar. 19, 2026).

¹²⁸ *Id.*

¹²⁹ *See Privacy Policy*, AMAZON,

25 https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_v4_sib?nodeId=GX7NJQ4ZB8MHFRNJ&ie=UTF8&ref=hp_left_v4_sib (last visited April 27, 2026).


26 ¹³⁰ *See Cookies*, AMAZON,

<https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/?nodeId=GVASXV5UZ64R4Y25> (last visited April 27, 2026).

1 Information] . . . and no other privacy topic” See *Cappello v. Walmart Inc.*, No. 18-cv-
 2 06678-RS, 2019 WL 11697705, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2019).

3 180. Defendant’s broad Privacy Policy does not expressly authorize the precise form
 4 of Personal Video Information at issue here. Defendant, therefore, did not obtain Purchasers’,
 5 including Plaintiffs’, VPPA-required consent.

6 181. At the time of purchase, Purchasers simultaneously assent to the Terms of Use
 7 and Privacy Policy through a single button click.



19 *Figure 18 – Checkout page on the Website where Purchasers agree to the Privacy Policy and*
 20 *the Terms of Use at the same time*

21 182. In the Terms of Use, Purchasers agree to receive communications electronically,
 22 are granted a license for use of the Website, accept risk of loss and title upon delivery of products
 23 to a carrier, agree to Coupon terms, agree to the law of the State of Washington, and agree to
 24 bring disputes in King County, Washington, among other legal obligations.

1 183. Defendant therefore never obtains consent from Purchasers in a form that is
2 “distinct and separate from any form setting forth other legal or financial obligations of the
3 consumer.” *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B)(i).

4 **IV. Plaintiffs Did Not Consent to Defendant’s Sharing of Plaintiffs’ Sensitive**
5 **Information**

6 184. Plaintiffs and the Class Members were unaware that the Tracking Tools
7 intercepted their communications in the form of their browsing history.

8 185. Plaintiffs and the Class Members reasonably believed that communications to
9 the Website were made in confidence.

10 186. With no notice or warning as to who was intercepting and decoding the contents
11 of their communications, Plaintiffs were not provided notice of or given an opportunity to
12 provide consent to the Meta Pixel’s and other Tracking Tools’ interceptions of Plaintiffs’
13 Sensitive Information.

14 187. Meta instructs and cautions website operators about the legal risks of using their
15 Tracking Tools without first providing adequate notice and obtaining valid consent for the
16 invasive collection of Users’ protected data. These companies also warn against making such
17 data available to Tracking Entities or enabling its interception. Indeed, Meta expressly requires
18 website operators to agree not to transmit Users’ sensitive data—even if consent is purportedly
19 obtained. Defendant accepted these terms as a condition of deploying the Tracking Tools on its
20 Website.

21 188. Plaintiffs were not given notice of the use of the Tracking Tools on the Website.

22 189. As a result, Plaintiffs did not and could not provide consent to the collection and
23 sharing of their Sensitive Information when visiting the Website, browsing products on the
24 Website, and purchasing pre-recorded audio-visual materials on the Website.

1 **TOLLING**

2 190. The statutes of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs' and the Class Members' claims
3 were tolled by Defendant's conduct and Plaintiffs' and the Class Members' delayed discovery
4 of their claims.

5 191. As alleged above, Plaintiffs and the Class Members did not know, and could not
6 have known, that when they used the Website, Defendant was disclosing their Sensitive
7 Information to Tracking Entities. Plaintiffs and the Class Members could not have discovered
8 Defendant's unlawful conduct with reasonable diligence.

9 192. Defendant secretly incorporated the Tracking Tools into the Website, providing
10 no indication to Users that their Sensitive Information would be intercepted and disclosed to the
11 Tracking Entities.

12 193. Defendant had exclusive and superior knowledge that the Tracking Entities'
13 Tracking Tools, incorporated on its Website, would disclose Users' Sensitive Information, yet
14 failed to disclose to Users that by interacting with the Website, Plaintiffs' and the Class
15 Members' Sensitive Information would be disclosed to the Tracking Entities.

16 194. Plaintiffs and the Class Members could not, with due diligence, have discovered
17 the full scope of Defendant's conduct because the incorporation of the Tracking Entities'
18 tracking tools is highly technical, and there were no disclosures or other indications that would
19 inform a reasonable consumer or Website User that Defendant was disclosing and allowing the
20 interception of such information to Tracking Entities.

21 195. The earliest that Plaintiffs and the Class Members could have discovered
22 Defendant's conduct was through their investigation and the work performed on their behalf in
23 preparation for filing this Complaint.

24 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

25 196. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of the following Class and
26 Subclasses:

1 **Class:** All natural persons in the United States who used Defendant’s Website
2 during the applicable limitations period and whose electronic communications
3 were intercepted, disclosed, and/or transmitted to the Tracking Entities through
4 Defendant’s Website’s use of the Tracking Tools (the “Class”).

5 **California Subclass:** All members of the Class who visited and interacted with
6 Defendant’s Website during the applicable limitations period while located in the
7 State of California (the “California Subclass”).

8 **Florida Subclass:** All members of the Class who visited and interacted with
9 Defendant’s Website during the applicable limitations period while located in the
10 State of Florida (the “Florida Subclass”).

11 **VPPA Subclass:** All members of the Class who purchased pre-recorded audio-
12 visual materials through Defendant’s Website during the applicable limitations
13 period (the “VPPA Subclass”).

14 197. Specifically excluded from the Class and Subclasses are Defendant, its officers,
15 directors, agents, trustees, parents, children, corporations, trusts, representatives, employees,
16 principals, servants, partners, joint venturers, or entities controlled by Defendant, and its heirs,
17 successors, assigns, or other persons or entities related to or affiliated with Defendant and/or its
18 officers and/or directors, the judge assigned to this action, and any member of the judge’s
19 immediate family.

20 198. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the Class and Subclass definitions above if
21 further investigation and/or discovery reveals that the Class or Subclasses should be expanded,
22 narrowed, further divided into subclasses, or otherwise modified in any way.

23 199. This action may be certified as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil
24 Procedure 23 because it satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and
25 superiority requirements therein.

26 200. Numerosity (Rule 23(a)(1)): At this time, Plaintiffs do not know the exact
number of members of the aforementioned Class and Subclasses. However, given the popularity
of Defendant’s Website, the number of persons within the Class is believed to be so numerous
that joinder of all members is impractical.

1 201. Typicality of Claims (Rule 23(a)(3)): Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the
2 Class and Subclasses because Plaintiffs, like all Class and Subclass Members, used the Website,
3 purchased pre-recorded audio-visual materials on the Website, and had their Sensitive
4 Information intercepted and transmitted via the Website's Tracking Tools.

5 202. Adequacy of Representation (Rule 23(a)(4)): Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately
6 represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to, nor
7 in conflict with, the individual members of the Class. Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel
8 who are experienced in consumer and commercial class action litigation and who will prosecute
9 this action vigorously.

10 203. Superiority (Rule 23(b)(3)): A class action is superior to other available methods
11 for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Because the monetary damages
12 suffered by individual Class and Subclass Members are relatively small, the expense and burden
13 of individual litigation make it impossible for individual Class and Subclass Members to seek
14 redress for the wrongful conduct asserted herein. If class treatment of these claims is not
15 available, Defendant will likely continue its wrongful conduct, will unjustly retain improperly
16 obtained revenues, or will otherwise escape liability for its wrongdoing as asserted herein.

17 204. Commonality and Predominance (Rule 23(a)(2), 23(b)(3)): There is a well-
18 defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved in this case. Questions
19 of law and fact common to the members of the Class and Subclasses that predominate over
20 questions that may affect individual members of the Class and Subclasses include:

- 21 a. Whether Defendant violated Plaintiffs' and the Class Members' privacy
22 rights;
- 23 b. Whether Defendant's acts and practices violated the VPPA;
- 24 c. Whether Defendant's acts and practices violated the Wiretap Act;
- 25 d. Whether Defendant's acts and practices violated CIPA;
- 26 e. Whether Defendant's acts and practices violated the FSCA;

1 f. Whether Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to equitable relief,
2 including, but not limited to, injunctive relief; and

3 g. Whether Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to statutory or
4 other forms of damages, and other monetary relief.

5 205. Information concerning Defendant's Website's data sharing practices is available
6 from Defendant's or third-party records.

7 206. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of
8 this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.

9 207. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members would run the
10 risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications and establish incompatible standards of conduct for
11 Defendant. Prosecution as a class action will eliminate the possibility of repetitious and
12 inefficient litigation.

13 208. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
14 Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
15 respect to the Class as a whole.

16 209. Given that Defendant's conduct is ongoing, monetary damages are insufficient,
17 and there is no complete and adequate remedy at law.

18 **CAUSES OF ACTION**

19 **COUNT I**

20 **VIOLATIONS OF THE VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT**

21 **18 U.S.C. § 2710**

22 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the VPPA Subclass)**

23 210. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege each and every allegation set
24 forth above as though fully set forth herein.

25 211. Plaintiffs bring this count on behalf of themselves and all members of the VPPA
26 Subclass.

1 212. The VPPA provides that “a video tape service provider who knowingly discloses,
2 to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer shall be liable to
3 the aggrieved person for” “actual damages but not less than liquidated damages in an amount of
4 \$2,500,” punitive damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as “such other
5 preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. §§
6 2710(b)(1), 2710(c)(2).¹³¹

7 213. “Personally identifiable information” is defined to include “information which
8 identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a
9 video tape service provider.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3).

10 214. A “video tape service provider” is “any person, engaged in the business, in or
11 affecting interstate commerce, of rental, sale, or delivery of pre-recorded video cassette tapes or
12 similar audio visual materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4).

13 215. Defendant violated the VPPA by knowingly disclosing Plaintiffs’ and other VPPA
14 Subclass Members’ Personal Video Information to Meta.

15 216. Defendant, through the Website, engages in the business of delivering pre-
16 recorded audio-visual materials to Purchasers, including Plaintiffs and the other VPPA Subclass
17 Members. The Website delivers pre-recorded audio-visual materials to Purchasers, including
18 Plaintiffs and the other VPPA Subclass Members, by selling those materials, including in the
19 form of video games that include cut scenes, to Plaintiffs and the other VPPA Subclass Members
20 on the Website.

21 217. Defendant is a “video tape service provider” because it curates, hosts, and sells
22 pre-recorded audio-visual materials on the Website, thereby “engag[ing] in the business, in or
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25 ¹³¹ 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) refers to “relief provided in subsection (d)”; however, “[t]his appears to be a typo, because
26 subsection (d) is a rule of evidence which renders inadmissible personally identifiable information, whereas
subsection (c) describes the remedies available to a VPPA plaintiff in a civil action.” *In re Nickelodeon Consumer
Privacy Litig.*, No. 2443 (SRC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91286, at *22 n.7 (D.N.J. July 2, 2014) (citing *Sterk v.
Redbox Automated Retail, LLC*, 672 F.3d 535, 537 (7th Cir. 2012)).

1 affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette
2 tapes or similar audio visual materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4).

3 218. Defendant qualifies as a “video tape service provider” under the VPPA.
4 Defendant is in the business of selling pre-recorded audio-visual materials.

5 219. Plaintiffs and the VPPA Subclass Members are “purchasers” because they
6 purchased pre-recorded audio-visual materials from Defendant’s Website. *See* 18 U.S.C. §
7 2710(a)(1).

8 220. Plaintiff Roth purchased *Pokemon Scarlet and Tales of Graces f Remastered* from
9 Defendant. *Pokemon Scarlet and Tales of Graces f Remastered* are prerecorded video content
10 because they contain prerecorded video cutscenes.¹³²

11 221. Plaintiff Rose purchased *Metroid Prime 4 Beyond* and *Donkey Kong Country*
12 *Returns HD* from Defendant. *Metroid Prime 4 Beyond* and *Donkey Kong Country Returns HD*
13 are prerecorded video content because they contain prerecorded video cutscenes.¹³³

14 222. Plaintiff Fonseca purchased *Dragon Ball: Sparking! Zero* from Defendant.
15 *Dragon Ball: Sparking! Zero* is prerecorded video content because it contains prerecorded video
16 cutscenes.¹³⁴

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18
19 ¹³² *Pokemon Scarlet and Violet Fans Put Voice Acting Into Key Cutscenes*, GAMERANX (Nov. 30, 2022)
[https://gameranx.com/updates/id/408362/article/pokemon-scarlet-and-violet-fans-put-voice-acting-into-key-](https://gameranx.com/updates/id/408362/article/pokemon-scarlet-and-violet-fans-put-voice-acting-into-key-cutscenes/)
cutscenes/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2026);

20 *Pokémon Scarlet & Violet - All Cutscenes (REUPLOAD)*, YOUTUBE,
21 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y6sYZWpk7Uw> (last visited Mar. 24, 2026); *What’s New in Tales of Graces f*
Remastered?, BANDAI NAMCO (Jan. 21, 2025), [https://www.nintendo-insider.com/tales-of-graces-f-remastered-](https://www.nintendo-insider.com/tales-of-graces-f-remastered-review/)
22 *review/* (last visited Mar. 24, 2026); *Tales of Graces f Remastered Review*, NINTENDO INSIDER (September 23, 2024),
<https://en.bandainamcoent.eu/tales-of/news/whats-new-tales-of-graces-f-remastered> (last visited Mar. 24, 2026);
Tales of Graces f Remastered ★ THE MOVIE / ALL CUTSCENES 【Cinematic Edition / No Skits】, YOUTUBE,
23 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eV1O-b2wPdU> (last visited Mar. 24, 2026)..

24 ¹³³ *METROID PRIME 4 BEYOND All Cutscenes (Full Game Movie) 4K 60FPS Ultra HD*, YOUTUBE,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WwFzVhIYhMw> (last visited Apr. 21, 2026); *Metroid Prime 4 Beyond - All*
Cutscenes [Full Movie] (4K), YOUTUBE, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikM8wGEbhE4> (last visited on April
25 21, 2026); *Donkey Kong Country Returns HD - All Cutscenes*, YOUTUBE,
[mhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WipeSnXBeyQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WipeSnXBeyQ) (last visited Apr. 21, 2026).

26 ¹³⁴ *Dragon Ball: Sparking! Zero*, BANDAI NAMCO, [https://en.bandainamcoent.eu/dragon-ball/dragon-ball-sparking-](https://en.bandainamcoent.eu/dragon-ball/dragon-ball-sparking-zero)
zero (last visited on March 18, 2026); *DRAGON BALL SPARKING ZERO All Cutscenes (Full Game Movie) 4K*
60FPS Ultra HD, YOUTUBE, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXncW1iUQg> (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).

1 223. Defendant, without disclosing to Purchasers or seeking consent, surreptitiously
2 shared Plaintiffs’ and the VPPA Subclass Members’ Personal Video Information to Meta.
3 Defendant utilized the Meta Pixel, which forced Plaintiffs’ web browsers to transmit Plaintiffs’
4 Personal Video Information, like their FIDs, along with Plaintiffs’ and the VPPA Subclass
5 Members’ event data, including the title of the pre-recorded audio-visual materials they
6 purchased, to Meta.

7 224. Defendant knowingly disclosed Plaintiffs’ and the VPPA Subclass Members’
8 Personal Video Information through its implementation of the Meta Pixel, which automatically
9 triggers the capture and transmission of such data. Defendant was specifically informed by the
10 Tracking Entities about how the Tracking Tools functioned, the scope of data collected, and their
11 capability to link individual Purchasers to their activity on the Website. Once the Meta Pixel
12 completes its automatic exchange, the resulting FID can be used by an ordinary person to readily
13 identify a specific Facebook account holder. See Section III(C) (process to identify an individual
14 using FID).

15 225. Plaintiffs and the VPPA Subclass Members did not provide Defendant with any
16 form of consent—either written or otherwise—to disclose their Personal Video Information to
17 Meta. Defendant failed to obtain “informed, written consent” from Purchasers “in a form distinct
18 and separate from any form setting forth other legal or financial obligations of the consumer”
19 and “at the election of the consumer,” either “given at the time the disclosure is sought” or
20 “given in advance for a set period of time, not to exceed 2 years or until consent is withdrawn
21 by the consumer, whichever is sooner.” *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

22 226. Defendant’s disclosures of Plaintiffs’ and the VPPA Subclass Members’ Personal
23 Video Information were not made in the “ordinary course of business” as the term is defined by
24 the VPPA. Defendant’s disclosure of Purchasers’ Personal Video Information to Meta was not
25 necessary for “debt collection activities, order fulfillment, request processing, [or] transfer of
26

1 ownership.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(2). Instead, Plaintiffs’ and the VPPA Subclass Members’
2 Personal Video Information was used to improve marketing effectiveness and generate profit.

3 227. In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B)(iii) expressly enumerates an opt-out right
4 for consumers, which requires video tape service providers like Defendant to “provide[] an
5 opportunity for the consumer to withdraw on a case-by-case basis or to withdraw from ongoing
6 disclosures, at the consumer’s election.” Defendant failed to provide an opportunity for Plaintiffs
7 and the VPPA Subclass Members to opt out as required by the VPPA.

8 228. On behalf of themselves and the VPPA Subclass Members, Plaintiffs seek: (i)
9 declaratory relief as to Defendant; (ii) injunctive and equitable relief as is necessary to protect
10 the interests of Plaintiffs and the VPPA Subclass Members by requiring Defendant to comply
11 with the VPPA’s requirements for protecting consumers’ Personal Video Information; (iii)
12 statutory damages of \$2,500 for each violation of the VPPA pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c);
13 and (iv) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and other litigation expenses.

14 ***Injunctive Relief of Defendant’s Ongoing Violations***

15 229. An actual and immediate controversy has arisen and now exists between
16 Plaintiffs and the putative Class they seek to represent, and Defendant, which parties have a
17 genuine and opposing interest in and whose interests are direct and substantial. Defendant has
18 violated, and continues to violate, Plaintiffs’ and the Class members’ privacy rights.

19 230. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their
20 claims and are thus entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.

21 231. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to stop the continuing violations of the
22 VPPA by Defendant. Unless enjoined by the Court, Defendant will continue to infringe on the
23 privacy rights of Plaintiffs and the VPPA Subclass members, and will continue to cause, or allow
24 to be caused, irreparable harm to Plaintiffs and VPPA Subclass members. Injunctive relief is in
25 the public interest to protect the Personal Video Information of Plaintiffs and the VPPA Subclass
26

1 members that would be irreparably harmed through continued interception and/or disclosure of
2 their Sensitive Information.

3 232. Defendant completely disregards its obligations under the VPPA by loading the
4 Tracking Tools onto the Website and facilitating the sharing of Purchasers', i.e., Plaintiffs' and
5 the VPPA Subclass members', Personal Video Information with Tracking Entities for any
6 ordinary person to access and use.

7 233. Despite brazenly violating the VPPA, Plaintiffs and the VPPA Subclass members
8 were provided with no notice of the employment of the Tracking Tools and no indication of how
9 or how much of their information was shared with Tracking Entities. Worse, in further violation
10 of the VPPA, Defendant did not seek or obtain any form of consent from Plaintiffs or the VPPA
11 Subclass members for the Tracking Tools' interception, disclosure, and/or use of the Personal
12 Video Information communicated to the Website.

13 234. This threat of injury to Plaintiffs and members of the VPPA Subclass arising from
14 Defendant's continuous violations requires temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive
15 relief to ensure that Plaintiffs' and the VPPA Subclass members' Personal Video Information is
16 protected from future unauthorized disclosure.

17 **COUNT II**
18 **COMMON LAW INVASION OF PRIVACY**
19 **Intrusion Upon Seclusion**
20 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)**

21 235. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege each and every allegation set
22 forth above as though fully set forth herein.

23 236. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of themselves and all Class Members.

24 237. Plaintiffs and the Class Members maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy
25 in their communications with Defendant via its Website. Users' search terms, browsing history,
26

1 geolocation data, and website activity have been recognized by society as sensitive
2 information.¹³⁵

3 238. Plaintiffs' and the Class Members' reasonable expectation of privacy is supported
4 by, *inter alia*, the VPPA's recognition that their Personal Video Information is Sensitive
5 Information that must be protected from unauthorized disclosure, as well as the Wiretap Act's
6 prohibition against unauthorized interception of communications.

7 239. Plaintiffs and the Class Members maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy
8 in believing that Defendant would not disclose their Sensitive Information to the Tracking
9 Entities.

10 240. Further, Plaintiffs and the VPPA Subclass Members maintained a reasonable
11 expectation of privacy in believing that Defendant, as a video tape service provider ("VTSP")
12 under the VPPA, would not disclose their Personal Video Information, which includes searches
13 for, viewing of, requests for, or acquisition of pre-recorded audio-visual materials.

14 241. Defendant had a duty to refrain from sharing such information absent explicit
15 authorization from Users, which it failed to obtain.

16 242. Plaintiffs and the Class Members have an interest in: (i) precluding the
17 dissemination and/or misuse of their Sensitive Information; and (ii) being free to visit and
18 interact with internet websites without being subjected to wiretaps without Plaintiffs' and/or the
19 Class Members' knowledge or consent.

20 243. Plaintiffs and the Class Members possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy
21 based on the belief that Defendant would abide by applicable state and federal laws, such as the
22 Wiretap Act and CIPA. CIPA prohibits Tracking Entities from intercepting communications
23 between Users, like Plaintiffs and the Class Members, and Defendant's Website without the
24

25 ¹³⁵ For example, California voted to pass the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, and voted to amend it in
26 "personal information," including real names, online identifiers, internet browsing and search history, location data,
audio and visual information, etc., requires businesses to provide adequate notice of such practices. See *generally*
Cal. Civ. Code §§1798.100, 1798.105, 1798.106, 1798.110, 1798.115, 1798.120, 1798.140(v).

1 consent of all parties involved in the communication. Through its placement of Tracking Tools
2 on the Website, Defendant enabled this interception and resulting intrusion upon Plaintiffs' and
3 Class Members' privacy.

4 244. As explained above, Defendant's actions constitute a serious invasion of privacy
5 that was an egregious breach of social norms, such that the breach was highly offensive to a
6 reasonable person because:

- 7 a. the invasion of privacy occurred in a highly sensitive setting – Plaintiffs'
8 communications with Defendant (applicable to the VPPA Subclass
9 members, Defendant is a VTSP);
- 10 b. Defendant had no legitimate objective or motive in invading Plaintiffs'
11 and the Class Members' privacy in such a manner;
- 12 c. Defendant violated multiple laws by invading Plaintiffs' and Class
13 Members' privacy, including the Wiretap Act and CIPA;
- 14 d. Defendant deprived Plaintiffs and Class Members of the ability to control
15 dissemination of their Sensitive Information; and
- 16 e. With respect to the VPPA Subclass Members, Defendant's actions are
17 also unacceptable as a matter of public policy because they undermine
18 the relationship between Purchasers of prerecorded audio-visual
19 materials and their VTSPs.

20 245. During the relevant time period, Defendant intentionally invaded the privacy
21 rights of Plaintiffs and Class Members by implementing Tracking Tools on its Website and
22 actively enabling the Tracking Entities to collect and intercept their sensitive and confidential
23 information.

24 246. As a direct and proximate result of this infringement upon their privacy, Plaintiffs
25 and the Class Members sustained harm and experienced various damages. In light of this injury,
26 Plaintiffs and Class Members are pursuing suitable remedies, such as compensatory damages,

1 restitution, disgorgement, punitive damages, and any other relief that the Court deems
2 appropriate and fair.

3 **COUNT III**
4 **VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT**
5 **18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.**
6 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)**

7 247. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege each and every allegation set
8 forth above as though fully set forth herein.

9 248. The federal Wiretap Act prohibits the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic
10 communications without the consent of at least one authorized party to the communication. See
11 18 U.S.C. § 2511.

12 249. The Wiretap Act confers a civil private right of action to “any person whose wire,
13 oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of
14 this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a).

15 250. The Wiretap Act defines “intercept” as “the aural or other acquisition of the
16 contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic,
17 mechanical, or other device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).

18 251. The Wiretap Act defines “contents” as “includ[ing] any information concerning
19 the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).

20 252. The Wiretap Act defines “person” as “any employee, or agent of the United States
21 or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint
22 stock company, trust, or corporation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6).

23 253. The Wiretap Act defines “electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs,
24 signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in
25 part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo optical system that affects
26 interstate or foreign commerce” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).

1 254. Plaintiffs, Defendant, and Tracking Entities are “persons” within the meaning of
2 the Wiretap Act.

3 255. The Meta Pixel and other Tracking Tools constitute “device[s] or apparatus[es]
4 which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5).

5 256. The confidential communications Plaintiffs had with the Website, in the form of,
6 *inter alia*, their search terms and browsing history, were surreptitiously intercepted by the
7 Tracking Entities and such communications were “electronic communications” under 18 U.S.C.
8 § 2510(12).

9 257. Plaintiffs, like all Users, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
10 electronic communications with Defendant’s Website, including their Sensitive Information.

11 258. A reasonable expectation of privacy depends on the nature of the intercepted
12 content. Communications reflecting Users’ choices, intent, and behavior on commercial
13 websites, such as searches, browsing, and order interactions, i.e., Sensitive Information, are
14 sensitive and convey the substance and meaning of the communication.

15 259. The expectation of privacy analysis must begin with reasonable Users assuming
16 that any contents of their communications that were disclosed were disclosed lawfully and with
17 consent. Otherwise, it would create the inference that reasonable Users should expect their
18 privacy to be illegally violated.

19 260. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ electronic communications with the Website included the
20 transmission of their Personal Video Information, which is more sensitive than general
21 electronic communications and browsing information and is afforded greater protection from
22 unauthorized interception, disclosure, and/or transmission.

23 261. Plaintiffs reasonably expected that Tracking Tools were not intercepting,
24 recording, or disclosing their electronic communications with the Website to the Tracking
25 Entities.
26

1 262. Within the relevant time period, the electronic communications between
2 Plaintiffs and the Website were intercepted by the Tracking Tools the instant they were sent to
3 the Website, without consent, and for the unlawful and wrongful purpose of monetizing their
4 Sensitive Information, which includes the purpose of using such private information to develop
5 advertising and marketing strategies.

6 263. Interception of Plaintiffs' confidential communications with the Website
7 occurred when Plaintiffs navigated various webpages of the Website.

8 264. At all times relevant to this complaint, Defendant's conduct was knowing,
9 willful, and intentional, as Defendant is a sophisticated party with full knowledge regarding the
10 functionality of the Tracking Tools. Specifically, Defendant knew that by allowing the Tracking
11 Tools to be implemented on the Website, the Sensitive Information of its Users would be shared
12 with Tracking Entities.

13 265. Plaintiffs did not consent to the exposure of their confidential electronic
14 communications with the Website to the Tracking Entities. Indeed, such consent could not have
15 been given as Defendant did not seek any form of consent from Plaintiffs for the Tracking Tools'
16 interception, recording, and disclosure of Plaintiffs' Sensitive Information.

17 266. As detailed above, the Tracking Entities' unauthorized interception and use of
18 Plaintiffs' confidential communications were only possible through Defendant's knowing,
19 willful, or intentional placement of the Tracking Tools on the Website. See 18 U.S.C. §
20 2511(1)(a).

21 267. Plaintiffs have been damaged due to the unauthorized interception, disclosure,
22 and use of their confidential communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2520. As such,
23 Plaintiffs are entitled to: (1) damages, in an amount to be determined at trial, assessed as the
24 greater of (a) the sum of the actual damages suffered by Plaintiffs and any profits made by the
25 tracking entities as a result of the violation, or (b) statutory damages of whichever is the greater
26

1 of \$100 per day per violation or \$10,000; (2) appropriate equitable or declaratory relief; and (3)
2 reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs reasonably incurred in accordance with the Terms.

3 **COUNT IV**
4 **VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT**
5 **Cal. Penal Code § 631**
6 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs Roth and Rose and the California Subclass)**

7 268. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose incorporate by reference and re-allege each and every
8 allegation set forth above as though fully set forth herein.

9 269. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose bring this count on behalf of themselves and the
10 California Subclass.

11 270. CIPA provides that a person is liable to another where, "by means of any
12 machine, instrument, contrivance, or in any other manner," committed any of the following: (i)
13 intentionally tapped, or made any unauthorized connection, whether physically, electrically,
14 acoustically, inductively or otherwise, with any telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, or
15 instrument, including the wire, cable, or instrument of any internal telephonic communication
16 system; or (ii) willfully and without consent of all parties to the communication, or in any
17 unauthorized manner, reads or attempts to read or learn the contents or meaning of any message,
18 report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line or cable or
19 is being sent from or received at any place within this state; or (iii) uses, or attempts to use, in
20 any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in any way, any information so obtained; or
21 (iv) aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to unlawfully do, or
22 permit or cause to be done any of the acts or things mentioned above in this section. Cal. Penal
23 Code § 631(a).

24 271. The Ninth Circuit has confirmed that one of the purposes of wiretapping statutes
25 is to "prevent the acquisition of the contents of a message by an unauthorized third-party"
26 *In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig.*, 956 F.3d at 608.

1 272. In dealing specifically with CIPA, the California Supreme Court has similarly
2 concluded that the objective of CIPA is to protect a person’s communications “from a situation
3 where the other person on the other end of the line permits an outsider” to monitor the
4 communication. *Ribas v. Clark*, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 364 (1985); *see also Smith v. LoanMe*, 11 Cal.
5 5th 183, 200 (2021).

6 273. The Website, including the Tracking Tools placed upon it, is a “machine,
7 instrument, contrivance, or ... other manner” used to engage in the prohibited conduct at issue
8 here.

9 274. Within the relevant time period, Plaintiffs Roth and Rose and the California
10 Subclass Members communicated their Sensitive Information to Defendant.

11 275. Within the relevant time period, Defendant, without the consent of all parties to
12 the communication, or in any unauthorized manner, willfully read or attempted to read or learn
13 the contents or meaning of electronic communications of Plaintiffs and the California Subclass
14 Members, contemporaneous with the communications transit through or passing over any wire,
15 line or cable or with the communications sending from or being received at any place within
16 California.

17 276. The information collected by the Tracking Tools was not for the sole benefit of
18 Defendant. Within the relevant time period, Defendant aided, agreed with, conspired with, and
19 employed the Tracking Entities to implement the Tracking Tools and to violate Cal. Penal Code
20 § 631.

21 277. Within the relevant time period, Defendant aided, agreed with, conspired with,
22 and employed the Tracking Entities to implement the Tracking Tools and to violate CIPA § 631.

23 278. Within the relevant time period, Defendant aided, agreed with, conspired with,
24 and employed the Tracking Entities to accomplish the wrongful conduct at issue here.

25 279. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose and the California Subclass Members did not authorize
26 or consent to the tracking, interception, and collection of any of their electronic communications.

1 280. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose and the California Subclass Members did not authorize
2 or consent to the tracking, interception, and collection of any of their electronic communications.
3 Defendant’s violations of Cal. Penal Code § 631 constitutes invasions of privacy of Plaintiffs’
4 and the California Subclass Members’ respective rights to privacy.

5 **COUNT V**
6 **VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT**
7 **Cal. Penal Code § 638.51**
8 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs Roth and Rose and the California Subclass)**

9 281. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose incorporate by reference and re-allege each and every
10 allegation set forth above as though fully set forth herein.

11 282. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose bring this count on behalf of themselves and all
12 California Subclass Members.

13 283. California’s Pen Register and Trap and Trace Law is part of CIPA, codified at
14 Cal. Penal Code §§ 630.50-638.55.

15 284. Pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 638.51, a person “may not install or use a pen
16 register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order”

17 285. A “pen register” is “a device or process that records or decodes dialing, routing,
18 addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire
19 or electronic communication is transmitted, but not the contents of a communication.” Cal. Penal
20 Code § 638.50(b).

21 286. A “trap and trace device” is “a device or process that captures the incoming
22 electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other dialing, routing,
23 addressing, or signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or
24 electronic communication, but not the contents of a communication.” Cal. Penal Code §
25 638.50(c).

1 287. “Process” includes “software that identifies consumers, gathers data, and
2 correlates that data through unique ‘fingerprinting.’” *Greenley v. Kochava, Inc.*, 684 F. Supp. 3d
3 1024, 1050 (S.D. Cal. 2023).

4 288. Cal. Penal Code § 638.51(a) provides that “a person may not install or use a pen
5 register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order”

6 289. No court order to install pen register or trap and trace devices via the Tracking
7 Tools was obtained by Defendant. Defendant uses pen register and trap and trace processes on
8 its Website by deploying Tracking Tools designed to capture phone numbers, email addresses,
9 routing information, addresses, and other signaling information of Website Users. The Tracking
10 Tools identify the source of the incoming electronic and wire communications to the Websites.

11 290. Defendant’s Tracking Tools constitute pen registers and/or trap and trace devices
12 because they are devices or processes that capture incoming electronic or other impulses that
13 identify addressing or signaling information from the electronic communications transmitted by
14 Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass Members’ PCs.

15 291. Defendant did not obtain consent from Plaintiffs Roth and Rose, or the California
16 Subclass Members, before using pen register or trap and trace technology to identify users of its
17 Websites, and has therefore violated Cal. Penal Code § 638.51.

18 292. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs Roth and Rose
19 and the California Subclass Members suffered losses and were damaged in an amount to be
20 determined at trial. CIPA imposes civil liability and statutory penalties for violations of Cal.
21 Penal Code § 638.51.

22 **COUNT VI**
23 **VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW**
24 **Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.**
25 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs Roth and Rose and the California Subclass)**

26 293. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose incorporate by reference and re-allege each and every
allegation set forth above as though fully set forth herein.

1 294. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose bring this count on behalf of themselves and all
2 California Subclass Members.

3 295. The UCL broadly prohibits acts of “unfair competition,” including any
4 “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.

5 296. Defendant has violated the unlawful prong of the UCL by way of Defendant’s
6 above-described violations of the Wiretap Act and CIPA arising from Defendant’s purposeful
7 installation and utilization of the Tracking Tools on the Website.

8 297. Defendant failed to adequately disclose the presence of the Tracking Tools on the
9 Website, which intercepted and transmitted Plaintiffs Roth and Rose’s and the California
10 Subclass Members’ Sensitive Information to the Tracking Entities without prior knowledge or
11 consent. Defendant facilitated and/or enabled the interception and transmittal of Plaintiffs Roth
12 and Rose’s and the California Subclass Members’ Sensitive Information to the Tracking Entities
13 to build personal profiles without their knowledge or consent in order to generate additional
14 revenue. Through this conduct, Defendant violated the unfair prong of the UCL.

15 298. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose have standing to bring claims against Defendant under
16 the UCL. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose’s information was tracked and recorded without their consent.
17 Plaintiffs Roth and Rose’s data was used to build personal profiles for advertising purposes
18 without consent.

19 299. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose would have considered it important to their decisions to
20 visit Defendant’s Website to know that their data was being tracked and recorded without their
21 consent.

22 300. Because of Defendant’s UCL violations described above, Plaintiffs Roth and
23 Rose suffered injury by losing control of their personal data and having their Sensitive
24 Information tracked and recorded without their consent.

25 301. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose and the California Subclass Members seek all available
26 relief, including injunctive relief, for Defendant’s use of unfair acts or practices.

COUNT VII
VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, Art. 1, § 1
(On Behalf of Plaintiffs Roth and Rose and the California Subclass)

1
2
3 302. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose incorporate by reference and re-allege each and every
4 allegation set forth above as though fully set forth herein.

5 303. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose bring this count on behalf of themselves and all
6 California Subclass Members.

7 304. Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution provides: “[a]ll people are by
8 nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
9 defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
10 obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” California Constitution, Article I, Section 1.

11 305. California voters added the word “and privacy” to the California Constitution
12 when they passed Proposition 11 in 1972. Proposition 11 is also known as the “Privacy
13 Initiative” or “Right to Privacy Initiative.”

14 306. In support of Proposition 11, voters stated that:

15 The right of privacy is the right to be left alone ... It prevents government and
16 business interests from collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about
17 us and from misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other
18 purposes or to embarrass us. Fundamental to our privacy is the ability to control
19 circulation of personal information. This is essential to social relationships and
20 personal freedom.

21 307. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose, and the California Subclass Members, have a legally
22 protected interest in their Sensitive Information, such as browsing activity, device identifiers,
23 and related metadata, which Defendant violated by providing the Tracking Entities with access
24 to that data, enabling the interception of such communications. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose, and
25 the California Subclass Members’ protected interests arise from various statutes and common
26 law, including, inter alia, the Wiretap Act, the CIPA, and the California Constitution, which
protect privacy rights and include the “ability to control circulation of our personal information.”

1 308. The privacy rights of Plaintiffs Roth and Rose and the California Subclass
2 Members were invaded through the interception and collection of their data, which included
3 their Sensitive Information and other sensitive information, without first obtaining authorization
4 or consent from Plaintiffs Roth and Rose and the California Subclass Members.

5 309. Plaintiffs Roth and Rose and the California Subclass Members had a reasonable
6 expectation of privacy when communicating with Defendant’s Website and thereby providing
7 and/or transmitting their Sensitive Information.

8 310. By causing third-party cookies and Tracking Entities to be placed on Users’
9 browsers and devices and by transmitting Users’ Sensitive Information to Tracking Entities
10 without consent, Defendant violated their reasonable expectation of privacy.

11 311. Defendant’s intrusion, placing third-party Tracking Tools and enabling third-
12 party access to Users’ Sensitive Information without their consent, is and would be highly
13 offensive to a reasonable person.

14 312. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s intentional invasion of their
15 privacy rights, Plaintiffs Roth and Rose and the California Subclass Members have been harmed
16 and are entitled to compensatory, punitive, and injunctive relief.

17 **COUNT VIII**
18 **VIOLATIONS OF THE FLORIDA SECURITY OF COMMUNICATIONS ACT**
19 **Fla. Stat. § 934.01, et seq.**
20 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff Fonseca and the Florida Subclass)**

21 313. Plaintiff Fonseca incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every
22 allegation set forth above as though fully set forth herein.

23 314. Plaintiff Fonseca brings this cause of action on behalf of himself and all Florida
24 Subclass Members.

25 315. The FSCA begins with legislative findings, stating that “[o]n the basis of its own
26 investigations and of published studies, the Legislature makes the following findings...(4) to
safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral communications when

1 none of the parties to the communications has consented to the interceptions should be allowed
2 only when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction and should remain under the control
3 and supervision of the authorizing court.” Fla. Stat. § 934.01(4).

4 316. Fla. Stat. § 934.10(1) provides that:

5 Any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted,
6 disclosed, or used in violation of ss. 934.03-934.09 shall have a civil cause of
7 action against any person or entity who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures
8 any person or entity to intercept, disclose, or use, such communications and shall
9 be entitled to recover from any such person or entity that engaged in that violation
10 such relief as may be appropriate, including: (a) [p]reliminary or equitable
11 declaratory relief as may be appropriate; (b) [a]ctual damages, but not less than
12 liquidated damages computed at the rate of \$100 a day for each day of the
13 violation or \$1,000, whichever is higher; (c) [p]unitive damages; and (d) [a]
14 reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.

15 317. The FCSA defines “electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs, signals,
16 writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
17 wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical systems that affects intrastate,
18 interstate, or foreign commerce.” Fla. Stat. § 934.02(12). The FSCA further defines “intercept”
19 as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication
20 through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” Fla. Stat. § 934.02(3).

21 318. The FSCA determines the location of the interception of a communication based
22 on “. . . where the communication originates [from].” *State v. Mozo*, 655 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla.
23 1995).

24 319. Fla. Stat. § 934.03(1)(a) prohibits any person from intentionally intercepting,
25 endeavoring to intercept, or procuring any other person to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic
26 communication, except as otherwise specifically provided by statute.

320. Fla. Stat. § 934.03(1)(c) further prohibits any person from intentionally
disclosing, or endeavoring to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through an unlawful interception.

1 321. Fla. Stat. § 934.03(1)(d) further prohibits any person from intentionally using, or
2 endeavoring to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or
3 having reason to know that the information was obtained through an unlawful interception.

4 322. Defendant’s conduct constitutes violations of Fla. Stat. § 934.03(1), where the
5 Website facilitated the Tracking Tools’ interception, disclosure, and use of Plaintiff Fonseca’s
6 and the Florida Subclass Members’ electronic communications without their consent.

7 323. Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(d) provides that interception is unlawful where all parties
8 to the communication have not given prior consent to such interception.¹³⁶

9 324. Plaintiff Fonseca and the Florida Subclass Members had a reasonable expectation
10 of privacy in their electronic communications with Defendant’s Website. Defendant violated
11 Plaintiff Fonseca’s and the Florida Subclass Members’ reasonable expectation of privacy by
12 intentionally causing the Tracking Tools to be embedded and executed on the Website in a
13 manner that recorded and transmitted the contents of Plaintiff Fonseca’s and the Florida Subclass
14 Members’ electronic communications to the Tracking Entities contemporaneously with the
15 communications and without Users’ knowledge or consent. The transmissions occurred
16 contemporaneously with the communications.

17 325. Defendant willingly facilitated the interception and collection of Plaintiff
18 Fonseca’s and the Florida Subclass Members’ communications by embedding and enabling the
19 Tracking Tools on their Website and configuring those tools to transmit data to third-party
20 servers in real time.

21 326. Defendant used the following items as devices or apparatuses to intercept wire,
22 electronic, or oral communications made by Plaintiff Fonseca and the Florida Subclass
23 Members:

24 _____
25 ¹³⁶ With respect to the FSCA’s requirement for prior consent of all parties to the intercepted communication, Fla.
26 Stat. § 934.03(2) contains exceptions related to ministerial operations of employees of communications service
providers, criminal investigations by law enforcement, and/or employees of fire stations, public utilities, and
ambulance services. None of the aforementioned enumerated exceptions are relevant to Plaintiff Fonseca’s claims
here.

- 1 a. The Website’s source code, which contained Tracking Tools that recorded
2 and disseminated the contents of users’ communications as they
3 interacted with the Website;
- 4 b. Plaintiff Fonseca’s and the Florida Subclass Members’ web browsers,
5 which were caused by the Website’s code to transmit communications to
6 Tracking Entities;
- 7 c. Plaintiff Fonseca’s and the Florida Subclass Members’ computing and
8 mobile devices;
- 9 d. Third-Party Web and advertising servers, which received and processed
10 intercepted communications for the Tracking Entities; and
- 11 e. Server-to-server communications between Defendant and the Tracking
12 Entities that enabled the dissemination of users’ communications
13 independent of user-initiated disclosures.

14 327. At all relevant times, Defendant procured the service of, aided, employed, agreed
15 with, and conspired with Tracking Entities to intercept Plaintiff Fonseca’s and the Florida
16 Subclass Members’ electronic communications while they accessed and interacted with
17 Defendant’s Website.

18 **COUNT IX**
19 **UNJUST ENRICHMENT**
20 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)**

21 328. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege each and every allegation set
22 forth above as though fully set forth herein.

23 329. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action on behalf of themselves and all Class
24 Members.

25 330. Defendant obtained a benefit by collecting, processing, and enabling third-party
26 monetization of Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ Sensitive Information, which Defendant then
used to increase the effectiveness of advertising, marketing, and sales and to generate revenue.

1 331. Defendant retained those benefits under circumstances in which the information
2 was collected and transmitted without valid consent. The information was collected and
3 transmitted in breach of Defendant's representations to visitors. Defendant's retention of those
4 benefits is unjust.

5 332. Plaintiffs and the Class Members conferred these benefits on Defendant, and
6 Defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiffs and the Class Members. Equity
7 and good conscience require restitution or disgorgement of the benefits unjustly retained by
8 Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to the relief set forth below.

9 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

10 **WHEREFORE**, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
11 seek judgment against Defendant, as follows:

- 12 a. For an order determining that this action is properly brought as a class
13 action and certifying Plaintiffs as the representatives of the Class and
14 their counsel as Class Counsel;
- 15 b. For an order declaring the Defendant's conduct violates the statutes
16 referenced herein;
- 17 c. For an order finding in favor of Plaintiffs, the Class, and Subclasses on
18 all counts asserted herein;
- 19 d. Entry of an order for injunctive and declaratory relief as described herein,
20 including, but not limited to, requiring Defendant to immediately (i)
21 remove the Tracking Tools from the Website or (ii) add, and obtain, the
22 appropriate consent from Users;
- 23 e. For damages in amounts to be determined by the Court and/or jury;
- 24 f. An award of statutory damages or penalties to the extent available;
- 25 g. For pre-judgment interest on all amounts awarded;
- 26 h. For an order of restitution and all other forms of monetary relief;

1 i. An award of all reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and
2 Such other and further relief as the Court deems necessary and appropriate.

3 **DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY**

4 Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury.

5
6 DATED this 29th day of April, 2026.

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