

(Eddie) Jae K. Kim (CA Bar No. 236805)
LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP
117 East Colorado Blvd., Suite 600
Pasadena, CA 91105
Tel.: (626) 550-1250
ekim@lcllp.com

Gary F. Lynch (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
Jamisen A. Etzel (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
Nicholas A. Colella (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP
1133 Penn Ave., 5th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Tel.: (412) 322-9243
gary@lcllp.com
jamisen@lcllp.com
nickc@lcllp.com

Christian Levis (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
Amanda Fiorilla (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
Rachel Kesten (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
Christopher Devivo (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.
44 South Broadway, Suite 1100
White Plains, NY 10601
Tel: (914) 997-0500
Fax (914) 997-0035
clevis@lowey.com
afiorilla@lowey.com
rkesten@lowey.com
cdevivo@lowey.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

JANE DOE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

HEY FAVOR, INC., FULLSTORY, INC.,
META PLATFORMS, INC., TIKTOK, INC.,
AND BYTEDANCE INC.

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:23-cv-59

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, asserts the following against Defendants Hey Favor, Inc. (“Favor”), FullStory, Inc. (“FullStory”), Meta Platforms, Inc. (f/k/a Facebook, Inc.) (“Meta”), TikTok, Inc. (f/k/a Musical.ly, Inc.) and ByteDance Inc. (collectively with TikTok, Inc., “TikTok”) based upon personal knowledge, where applicable, information and belief, and the investigation of counsel.

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

1. Founded in 2016, Favor (formerly the “Pill Club”) is a combination telemedicine company and direct-to-consumer pharmacy that prescribes its patients birth control, emergency

1 contraception (e.g., morning-after-pills), STI test kits, acne medicine, and prescription-strength
2 retinol. Users can also purchase directly from Favor other menstrual care and sexual wellness
3 products, like condoms, lubrication, and pregnancy tests, and learn from medical information it
4 provides on health and wellness topics, like periods, skin conditions, and birth control. Visitors
5 access these services and products through Favor’s website at www.heyfavor.com and/or through
6 its mobile app (collectively, “the Favor Platform”).

7 2. Favor represents that its “digital primary care” platform is designed to “[m]ake
8 healthcare more accessible.” Favor is now available in 49 states and Washington, D.C. and its
9 website receives approximately 450,000 monthly visitors. Favor states that the Favor Platform has
10 allowed “3 million patients get access to birth control” to date.¹

11 3. Favor’s services are comprised of three main components: (1) its “Medical Team”
12 consisting of doctors and nurse practitioners who review users’ health history, evaluate their needs,
13 prescribe medications, and answer medical questions; (2) its “Pharmacy Team” comprised of
14 pharmacists and technicians who review and process medication orders; and (3) its “Patient Care
15 Team” who assist patients and personalize their care.

16 4. Customers must provide Favor with personally identifiable information (“PII”) (e.g.,
17 their names, email addresses, date of birth, place of residence, payment information, and health
18 insurance information) to use its telehealth platform. Favor also collects other identifiable
19 information from users, including their IP address, unique device information and identifiers, and
20 cookie data, which are used to track users across the internet.

21 5. Favor requires users to complete an “online consultation” that prompts users to
22 “[a]nswer . . . health questions” before they can receive medication. These questions are highly
23 sensitive and ask users directly for medical information, including their medical history. For
24 example, a patient visiting the Favor Platform for birth control is asked: (1) “what type of birth
25 control are you on?”; (2) “are you pregnant?”; (3) “how long has it been since you last gave birth?”;
26 (4) “how frequently would you like your period?”; (5) “are you taking hormones?”; (6) “do you
27 have any history of breast cancer?”; (7) “do you have high cholesterol medicine?”; and (8) “what

28 _____
¹ Favor Home Page, <https://heyfavor.com/> (last visited Dec. 21, 2022).

1 other medications are you on?” Users are required to answer similar, highly sensitive medical
2 questions about their health to obtain emergency contraception, acne medicine, and other treatment
3 through the Favor Platform.

4 6. Favor also requires users from certain states, including those in Arkansas where
5 Plaintiff resides, to complete a separate medical consultation over video chat prior to obtaining a
6 prescription. During this consultation, a medical professional evaluates the user, prompting them to
7 answer additional health questions, including those about the patient’s medication, medical history,
8 and family health history.

9 7. Favor uses the answers to these questions to create a “digital health profile” for each
10 user, which its Medical Team evaluates to determine treatment options and prescribe medication “if
11 medically appropriate.” Favor’s Pharmacy Team sends any prescribed medication directly to the
12 consumer, while its Patient Care Team continues to provide care after the medication is delivered
13 by, among other things, answering questions the user may have about their medication or side
14 effects.

15 8. Plaintiff and Class members provided their information to Favor based on the
16 company’s repeated assurances that their intimate health data, PII, and other information would
17 remain protected and confidential.

18 9. For instance, Favor represents that it “understand[s] that medical information about
19 [users] and [their] health is personal” and that Favor is “committed to protecting it.”

20 10. Favor further states that it “takes the privacy of [users’] data and information very
21 seriously” and that “[a]ll of the information [Favor] hold[s] is *treated as Protected Health*
22 *Information (PHI).*” Accordingly, users’ “data is held to *even stricter privacy standard* than
23 required by CCPA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), California
24 Confidentiality Of Medical Information Act, and Texas Medical Privacy Act, as some examples.)”

25 11. Favor goes on to ensure users that it is “required by law to make sure that medical
26 information which identifies [users] is kept private (with certain exceptions).” These “exceptions”
27 include the disclosure of users’ information to provide medical treatment (e.g., to doctors or nurses
28 involved in the users’ treatment) and for payment processing (e.g., sending information about the

1 users' prescriptions to the users' health plan in order to get paid) and does not include the disclosure
2 of users' information for marketing, advertising, tracking, or analytics.

3 12. Favor also promises users that it does not disclose any "personal information" to
4 third parties, including analytics companies, and expressly represents the only information it
5 discloses is "aggregated" and "non-identifying" and that the third parties who receive it cannot use
6 that information "for their commercial purposes." It even states in all bold and capital letters "WE
7 DO NOT SELL OR MARKET YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION AT ANY TIME."

8 13. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff and Class members, Favor knowingly and intentionally
9 disclosed, and allowed third parties like Meta, TikTok, and FullStory (collectively, "Advertising
10 and Analytics Defendants") to intercept users' health data and other highly sensitive information.
11 Favor disclosed and allowed third parties to intercept at least users' prescription information (e.g.,
12 that they were prescribed birth control), answers to health questions (e.g., "what is your most recent
13 blood pressure reading?" and "have you had or do you currently have breast cancer?"), medication
14 side effects, allergies, age, and weight. In some instances, as is the case with FullStory, Favor
15 disclosed and allowed FullStory to intercept *all of the users' interactions* on the Favor Platform
16 (e.g., all individual clicks, keystrokes, and mouse movements) including their answers to highly
17 sensitive medical questions.

18 14. This information was not aggregated or deidentified nor were third parties prohibited
19 from using this information for their own benefit, as Favor claimed.

20 15. Plaintiff Jane Doe provided her information, including health data and PII in
21 connection with obtaining prescriptions for birth control and emergency contraceptives, to Favor
22 with the expectation that this information would remain confidential and private.

23 16. Defendants' disclosure and interception of this information without consent
24 constitute an extreme invasion of Plaintiff's and Class members' privacy. Given the secret and
25 undisclosed nature of Defendants' conduct, additional evidence supporting Plaintiff's claims,
26 including the full extent of medical information Defendants disclosed and/or intercepted, and how
27 they used that information, will be revealed in discovery.

28

PARTIES

A. Plaintiff

17. **Plaintiff Jane Doe** is a resident of Hempstead County, Arkansas.

18. Plaintiff used the Favor Platform in or around the summer of 2021 to obtain medical services and products, including prescriptions for birth control, emergency contraception and condoms through the Favor Platform.

19. During the time Plaintiff used the Favor Platform, she maintained social media accounts with TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram. Plaintiff Jane Doe used the same device she used to access the Favor Platform to access these social media platforms.

20. To obtain her birth control prescriptions, Plaintiff Jane Doe was required to: (1) create a Favor account, (2) provide her PII, including her name, address, email, and health insurance information, and (3) provide her medical history and answer questions in response to Favor’s health questionnaire, as described in paragraph 4-6, 13 above.

21. Plaintiff Jane Doe was also required to complete an additional medical consultation over video chat each time she wished to obtain a prescription. During this consultation, a medical professional evaluated Plaintiff Jane Doe over video and asked questions about her medical history, including what medications she takes and her family health history.

22. Plaintiff Jane Doe was required to answer additional health questions to obtain emergency contraception, including: (1) “what type of birth control do you use currently?”; (2) whether you are currently pregnant or breastfeeding; (3) what medications you take; (4) “do you have any medication allergies?”; and (5) “are you allergic to corn-containing products or food dye?”.

23. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff Jane Doe, Favor disclosed and allowed third parties to intercept this information, including her PII, health data, prescription requests, and other activity across the Favor Platform.

24. Plaintiff Jane Doe did not consent to the sharing and interception of her data, which was never disclosed and directly contrary to the representations made by Favor.

1 **B. Defendants**

2 25. **Defendant Hey Favor, Inc.** is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
3 business at 951 Mariner’s Island Boulevard, Suite 300, San Mateo, California, 94402.

4 26. Favor knowingly and intentionally incorporated a host of tracking technology for
5 marketing, advertising, and analytics purposes on the Favor Platform without disclosure to its users,
6 including at least the Meta software development kit (“SDK”), the Meta Pixel, the TikTok Pixel,
7 and the Session Replay Software from FullStory.

8 27. Advertising and Analytics Defendants developed each of these tracking technologies
9 for the express purpose of collecting data from users for, among other things, marketing, analytics,
10 and advertng purposes. *See* Sections C-E, below.

11 28. Favor knew at the time it incorporated this software into the Favor Platform that it
12 would result in the disclosure of users’ interactions on the Favor Platform, including PII, health
13 information, prescription requests, and other identifiable information, by virtue of how this
14 technology functions and the analytics and insights it received as a result. For example, Meta
15 provides website and app developers, like Favor, that use the Meta Pixel and its SDK with access
16 to the data collected from their users and provides them with tools and analytics to leverage that
17 information to reach these individuals through Facebook ads. *See* Section D, below. The same is
18 true for the TikTok Pixel, which provides similar advertising functionality, and FullStory’s session
19 replay software, which provides a dashboard that allows them to filter sessions by user and action.

20 29. Despite this, Favor continued to incorporate Advertising and Analytics Defendants’
21 technology into the Favor Platform and reap its benefit, including by increasing its overall revenue
22 through advertisements and by improving the Favor Platform. As such, Favor’s conduct was
23 intentional despite knowing the privacy violations it caused to Plaintiff and Class members.

24 30. **Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc.** is a Delaware corporation with its principal place
25 of business located in Menlo Park, California 94025.

26 31. Meta at all times knew that the incorporation of its software into the Favor Platform
27 would result in its interception of identifiable health information and other sensitive data.
28

1 32. Meta, as the creator of its SDK and Meta Pixel, knew that it intercepted each of a
2 user’s interactions on the website or mobile application that incorporated this technology.

3 33. Meta has consistently come under scrutiny for incorporating its technology on
4 websites and applications that involve the transmittal of sensitive data, including health information,
5 yet continues to do so.

6 34. For instance, in February 2019, the *Wall Street Journal* published an in-depth
7 analysis of Meta’s collection of sensitive health information using its tracking technology from
8 certain mobile applications. These reports led to a subsequent investigation by the Federal Trade
9 Commission, who confirmed that Meta did in fact collect sensitive health information from a
10 popular women’s health app, including pregnancy data, between June 2016 to February 2019. It also
11 confirmed that Meta went on to use this information for its own research and development. The
12 New York State Department of Financial Services conducted a similar investigation of Meta and
13 reached a similar conclusion, including finding that Meta did not take sufficient steps or precautions
14 to prevent its interception of this kind of information or its use for commercial purposes.

15 35. Further, since at least 2016, Meta has allowed granular ad targeting based on
16 sensitive information collected or received about individuals, including relating to at least breast
17 feeding, ethnicities, religious beliefs, and income levels.

18 36. Despite this, it was not until November 9, 2021, that Meta acknowledged its use of
19 data to target users based on “sensitive” topics, including “health” and how that was problematic.
20 While Meta stated that it would remove this functionality in part, it later clarified that the change
21 was limited to individuals’ interactions with “content” on the Facebook platform (i.e., the “Detailed
22 Targeting” option on Facebook) and *did not apply to* data intercepted through Meta Pixel or SDK
23 or collected through other means. Thus, advertisers were still permitted to use “website custom
24 audiences” and “lookalike” audiences to target users based on the information Meta intercepted
25 through Meta Pixel and its SDK.

26 37. Further, Meta has acknowledged its interception of sensitive data, including health
27 information, in public statements highlighting its efforts to develop a “Health Terms Integrity
28

1 System” intended to filter out this type of information and prevent them from entering Meta’s
2 system.

3 38. However, independent investigations have confirmed these data filtration systems
4 are not successful at preventing the interception of health data. For instance, researchers at *The*
5 *Markup* found while investigating the use of Meta Pixel on abortion-related websites that Meta’s
6 purported “filtering” system failed to discard even the most obvious forms of sexual health
7 information, including URLs that included the phrases “post-abortion” “i-think-im-pregnant” and
8 “abortion-pill.”

9 39. Meta’s own employees have confirmed the same, admitting that Meta lacks the
10 ability to prevent the collection of sensitive health data or its use in ads. For example, Meta engineers
11 on the ad and business product team wrote in a 2021 privacy overview “We do not have an adequate
12 level of control and explainability over how our systems use data, and thus we can’t confidently
13 make controlled policy changes or external commitments such as ‘we will not use X data for Y
14 purpose.’”

15 40. As demonstrated by Favor’s continued use of Meta’s Pixel and SDK, Meta did not
16 take any steps to prevent Favor from using its technology on the Favor Platform or to prevent its
17 interception and use of Favor users’ sensitive health data—like answers to health questions to obtain
18 birth control.

19 41. As such, Meta’s conduct was intentional despite knowing the privacy violations it
20 caused to Plaintiff and Class members.

21 42. **Defendant TikTok, Inc.** is a California corporation with its principal place of
22 business located in Culver City, California.

23 43. **Defendant ByteDance Inc.** is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
24 business located in Mountain View, California. Upon information and belief, Defendant
25 TikTok, Inc. and ByteDance Inc. do not operate as independent corporate entities, but rather
26 function as satellite offices of the China-headquartered company ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd.

27

28

1 44. Since its founding, TikTok has come under scrutiny for the types of data it collects,
2 stores, and shares, ranging from government fines over collecting children’s data to whether the app
3 itself poses a national security risk for who it shares data with.

4 45. TikTok, as the creator of the TikTok Pixel, knew that it intercepted each of a user’s
5 interactions on the website or mobile application in which it is incorporated including those like the
6 Favor Platform, which involve sensitive medical information.

7 46. TikTok’s Pixel has come under intense scrutiny recently for its interception and
8 collection of health data. A December 13, 2022 article by *The Markup* detailed these concerns,
9 specifically highlighting the TikTok Pixel’s presence on the Favor Platform as an example.

10 47. TikTok has not denied that it intercepts and collects user’s sensitive medical data or
11 that it uses that data for commercial purposes. Rather, when pressed by journalists from Consumer
12 Reports about its concerning practice of collecting health information, TikTok responded only that
13 it “continuously work[s] with [its] partners to avoid inadvertent transmission of such data.”

14 48. As demonstrated by Favor’s continued use of TikTok’s Pixel, TikTok did not take
15 any steps to prevent Favor from using its technology on the Favor Platform or to prevent its
16 interception and use of Favor users’ sensitive data.

17 49. As such, TikTok’s conduct was intentional despite knowing the privacy violations it
18 caused to Plaintiff and Class members.

19 50. **Defendant FullStory, Inc.** is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
20 business at 1745 Peachtree Street NE, Suite G, Atlanta, Georgia 30309.

21 51. FullStory is well aware of the privacy concerns arising out of its tracking technology,
22 including its session replay software.

23 52. For example, a 2017 report from researchers at Princeton University found
24 Walgreens.com’s use of session replay code was leaking website visitors’ medical conditions and
25 prescriptions to FullStory. Because users’ names had been leaked earlier in website sessions,
26 FullStory was able to link users’ identities to the medicine that they were prescribed.

27 53. This occurred despite Walgreens using additional manual redaction tools to keep
28 website visitors’ information private. In response to the discovery, Walgreens stopped using

1 FullStory “out of an abundance of caution.” FullStory, on the other hand, took no affirmative steps
2 to prevent its interception and identification of users through this software.

3 54. Other companies likewise denounced FullStory’s session replay software after
4 finding out FullStory obtained credit card information through its incorporation. For example,
5 clothing company Bonobos.com, announced that “We eliminated data sharing with FullStory in
6 order to evaluate our protocols and operations with respect to their service. We are continually
7 assessing and strengthening systems and processes in order to protect our customers’ data.”

8 55. Accordingly, FullStory understands that its software intercepts highly sensitive data,
9 including health and medical information when used on a website or application like the Favor
10 Platform, and that it would continue to do so as long as it remained installed.

11 56. As demonstrated by Favor’s continued use of FullStory’s session replay software,
12 FullStory did not take any steps to prevent Favor from using its technology on the Favor Platform
13 or to prevent its interception and use of Favor users’ sensitive health data—like answers to health
14 questions to obtain birth control.

15 57. As such, FullStory’s conduct was intentional despite knowing the privacy violations
16 it caused to Plaintiff and Class members.

17 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

18 58. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
19 § 1332(d), because the amount in controversy for the Class exceeds \$5,000,000 exclusive of interest
20 and costs, there are more than 100 putative members of the Classes defined below, and a significant
21 portion of putative Class members are citizens of a state different from the Defendants.

22 59. This Court also has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
23 § 1332(a) because the amount in controversy in this case exceeds \$75,000 and this action is between
24 citizens of different states.

25 60. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Favor because its principal place of
26 business is in California. Favor’s Terms and Conditions also include a forum selection clause,
27 providing that: “You agree to the personal jurisdiction and venue of the state and federal courts in
28 Santa Clara County, California and waive any objection to such jurisdiction or venue.”

1 Additionally, Favor is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this State because a substantial part
2 of the events and conduct giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this State. Favor operates the
3 Favor Platform from this State and makes all policies and decisions regarding the operation of the
4 Favor Platform. Furthermore, Favor disclosed Plaintiff's and Class members' sensitive data,
5 including health information, to third parties, including Meta and TikTok, which are located in this
6 State, and who used that data for their own commercial purposes within this State.

7 61. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Meta because its principal place of business
8 is in California. Meta is also subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this State because a
9 substantial part of the events and conduct giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this State,
10 including Meta's collection of Plaintiff's sensitive health data from the Favor Platform and use of
11 that data for commercial purposes.

12 62. This Court has personal jurisdiction over TikTok Inc. because its principal place of
13 business is in Culver City, California. In addition, this Court has personal jurisdiction over
14 ByteDance Inc. because its principal place of business is in Mountain View, California. Moreover,
15 TikTok and ByteDance are subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this State because a substantial
16 part of the events and conduct giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this State, including
17 TikTok's and ByteDance's collection of Plaintiff's sensitive health data from the Favor Platform
18 and use of that data for commercial purposes.

19 63. This Court has personal jurisdiction over FullStory because a substantial part of the
20 events and conduct giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this State, including relating to
21 Favor's implementing of its session replay technology, and FullStory purposefully availed itself of
22 the forum by, among other things, marketing and selling the session replay technology at issue in
23 this case to Defendant Favor and other technology companies headquartered in this State.

24 64. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c), and (d) because
25 a substantial portion of the conduct described in this Class Action Complaint was carried out in this
26 District. Furthermore, Defendants Favor and Meta are headquartered in this District and subject to
27 personal jurisdiction in this District.

28

69. Today, Favor’s mission is “to create a new kind of healthcare for women and people who menstruate” through its “developed [] coalition of medical professionals, pharmacists, patient care experts, policy experts, and many more people to bring you the quality of care you deserve.” Favor touts itself as providing “digital care, prescriptions and products for a better wellbeing” using “U.S. licensed medical providers,” being a “licensed pharmacy” and “accepting most insurance.”

70. Favor’s products cover a wide range of healthcare services, from prescriptions for birth control, STI testing, to prescription skin care and over-the-counter products. Favor’s most popular products are birth control (from over 120 brands), emergency contraception (“morning-after-pill”), STI (sexually transmitted infection) kits, condoms, and acne medications.

71. Before a customer can obtain a prescription for birth control from Favor, they must first create an account and answer an extensive medical history questionnaire encompassing a series of sensitive, health-related questions, in addition to provided other health-related information. The questions include: (1) “what type of birth control are you on?”; (2) “are you pregnant?”; (3) “how long has it been since you last gave birth?”; (4) “how frequently would you like your period?”; (5) “are you taking hormones?”; (6) “are you breast feeding?”; (7) “are you menopausal?”; (8) “do you have history of breast cancer?”; (9) “do you have high cholesterol?”; (10) “select what other medications are you on?”; (11) “what is your blood pressure range?”; (12) “do you have heart disease?”; (13) “do you have hypertension?”, and many more.

Favor

Medical Consultation 2 of 3

Are you taking any of these medications or supplements?

Please select all that apply.

- Rifampin or Rifabutin, e.g. Rifadin, Mycobutin
- Certain Anticonvulsants (including topiramate and lamotrigine)
- Barbiturates

1 72. Likewise, a customer seeking emergency contraception must answer questions
2 including: (1) “what type of birth control do you use currently?”; (2) whether you are currently
3 pregnant or breastfeeding; (3) what medications you take; (4) “do you have any medication
4 allergies?”; and (5) “are you allergic to corn-containing products or food dye?”.

5 73. As another example, to get a prescription for acne medication, a customer must
6 answer questions including: (1) “what are your skincare goals?”; (2) “where do you have acne?”;
7 (3) “at what age did you start having acne?”; (4) “how would you describe your skin?”; (5) “is the
8 skin on your face sensitive?”; (6) “do you have eczema?”; (7) “do you have rosacea?”; (8) “do you
9 have a suspicious lesion on your face that you are concerned about?”; (9) “have you ever used any
10 medication (prescription or over-the-counter) on your face?”; (10) “do you have any active
11 ingredients and strengths you’re interested in for treating acne?”; (11) “are you okay to experience
12 some skin peeling and skin irritation at the beginning of your treatment?”; (12) whether you are
13 currently pregnant or breastfeeding; (13) “do you have any allergies?”; and (14) whether you have
14 any medical conditions, are taking any medications, or have had any surgeries.

15 74. Once the questionnaire is completed, the user is paired with a member of Favor’s
16 Medical Team, consisting of doctors and nurse practitioners, licensed in the user’s state. The doctor
17 or nurse practitioner “review [the user’s] health history” and questionnaire results before prescribing
18 medication based on the individual’s needs if “medically appropriate.” Favor also has registered
19 nurses who are available to answer any medical-related questions a customer may have.

20 75. Favor’s Pharmacy Team, encompassing pharmacists, intern pharmacists, and
21 pharmacy technicians, then review and process the prescription. Favor accepts most health insurance
22 policies and Medicaid and offers cash pricing to those that are uninsured.

23 76. After the prescription is received, members of Favor’s Patient Care Team are
24 available to answer any additional questions the user may have relating to the prescription, side
25 effects, or treatment plan.

26 77. In addition to providing medical care and prescriptions, Favor also offers over-the-
27 counter sexual and reproductive healthcare products and skincare. Users can purchase condoms,
28 female condoms, pregnancy tests, and moisturizers, among other products.

1 78. Favor also provides medical information to individuals through its blog, which
2 contains a variety of articles relating to sexual wellness, reproductive health, medication, and side
3 effects to certain products. For instance, Favor features an article on its website “What Birth Control
4 is best for PCOS?” (polycystic ovary syndrome, and another titles “Bleeding After Plan B: Causes &
5 Side Effects.”).

6 **B. Favor’s Promises to Users & Sharing of Data**

7 79. Favor pledges to users that it “takes the privacy of [users’] data and information very
8 seriously” and that “[a]ll of the information [Favor] hold[s] is *treated as Protected Health*
9 *Information (PHI).*” Accordingly, users’ “data is held to *even stricter privacy standard* than
10 required by CCPA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), California
11 Confidentiality Of Medical Information Act, Texas Medical Privacy Act, as some examples.)”

12 80. Favor promises users that it does not disclose to third parties, including analytics
13 companies, *any* “personal information.” Favor claims the only information it shares is “aggregated”
14 and “non-identifying” and that third parties cannot use information “for their commercial purposes.”

15 81. It then states it all bold and capital letters “WE DO NOT SELL OR MARKET YOUR
16 PERSONAL INFORMATION AT ANY TIME.”

17 82. Given these representations and the types of services Favor provides, users like
18 Plaintiff and Class member expected their data, including health information, and other interactions
19 on the Favor website, to remain confidential.

20 83. Despite these promises, Favor not only disclosed but allowed third parties to
21 intercept, highly sensitive personal and medical information Plaintiff and Class members entered on
22 the Favor Platform, including their PII, prescriptions, answers to health questions (described above),
23 medication side effects, allergies, age, and weight. This information was shared with at least
24 Advertising and Analytics Defendants TikTok, Meta, and FullStory.

25 84. With respect to FullStory, Favor disclosed and allowed FullStory to intercept *all of*
26 *the users’ interactions* on the Favor Platform—i.e., every click, tap, scroll, mouse movement and
27 keystroke—including the highly sensitive medical information users entered into the Favor Platform
28 when seeking treatment.

1 **C. TikTok’s Tracking Technology on the Favor Platform**

2 85. TikTok has more than 750 million monthly users worldwide and is one of the top
3 five largest social media companies. TikTok’s main source of revenue is selling ads, with reports
4 showing that TikTok’s ad revenue for this year alone surpassed \$12 billion.

5 86. TikTok’s parent company reports similar growth with its advertising revenue
6 increasing year to year, jumping from just \$7.3 billion in 2018 to \$38.6 billion by 2021.

Year	Total Revenue	Ad Revenue	% Ad Revenue
2021	\$58 billion	\$38.6 billion	66%
2020	\$34.4 billion	\$30 billion	87%
2019	\$17.15 billion	\$16.5 billion	96%
2018	\$7.4 billion	\$7.3 billion	98%

7
8
9
10
11 87. To increase its advertising revenue, TikTok offers tracking and analytics services,
12 including the TikTok Pixel. More than a million websites, including Favor, incorporate the TikTok
13 Pixel.

14 88. The TikTok Pixel is a piece of HTML code placed on a website that tracks users’
15 interactions, including what pages they view, buttons they click on, and information they enter,
16 along with a unique identifier.

17 89. The TikTok Pixel intercepts these communications immediately after they are sent
18 and before they are received by the website operator.

19 90. In addition, the TikTok Pixel collects identifiable information such as the users’ IP
20 address, the device make, model, and operating system, browser information, a unique session ID,
21 and first and third party cookie data that can be associated with a specific user.

22 91. TikTok uses the cookies it collects and/or its “Advanced Matching” feature to
23 “recognize and learn about people from [the] website and the types of actions they do or don’t take.”
24 In April 2022, TikTok made its collection of first- and third-party cookies automatic across all
25 websites that incorporated the TikTok Pixel prior to March 10, 2022.

26 92. Once the TikTok Pixel intercepts this data, it is sent to TikTok’s server, where it is
27 stored and processed. The data collected by TikTok is then used to match website actions to
28

1 individuals, as well as provide attribution reports and track users. Further, if the user has a TikTok
2 account, the data is used in connection with TikTok’s advertising services.

3 93. Favor intentionally incorporates the TikTok Pixel on the Favor Platform. This
4 discloses and allows TikTok to intercept Favor users’ interactions with the Favor Platform,
5 including personal information. As a result, information Plaintiff Jane Doe provided to Favor to
6 obtain birth control, emergency contraception, and condoms was disclosed to and intercepted by
7 TikTok.

8 94. Plaintiff Jane Doe did not consent to the interception or disclosure of her data to
9 TikTok. Favor’s disclosure, and TikTok’s interception, of Plaintiff Jane Doe’s sensitive data
10 without her consent is an invasion of privacy and violates several laws, including the California
11 Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (“CMIA”) and the California Invasion of Privacy Act
12 (“CIPA”).

13 **D. Meta’s Tracking Technology on the Favor Platform**

14 95. Meta is one of the largest advertising companies in the country. To date, Meta
15 generates nearly 98% of its revenue through advertising bringing in a grand total of \$114.93 billion.

16 96. Meta’s advertising business began back in 2007 with the creation of “Facebook
17 Ads,” which was marketed as a “completely new way of advertising online” that would allow
18 “advertisers to deliver more tailored and relevant ads.”

19 97. Today, Meta provides advertising on its own platforms, such as Facebook and
20 Instagram, as well as websites outside these apps through the Facebook Audience Network.
21 Facebook alone has more than 2.9 billion active users.²

22 98. Meta’s advertising business has been extremely successful due, in large part, to
23 Meta’s ability to target people at a granular level. “Among many possible target audiences, [Meta]
24 offers advertisers,” for example, “1.5 million people ‘whose activity on Facebook suggests that
25 they’re more likely to engage with/distribute liberal political content’ and nearly seven million
26 Facebook users who ‘prefer high-value goods in Mexico.’”

27
28 ²<https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/>

1 99. Given the highly specific data used to target specific users, it is no surprise that
 2 millions of companies and individuals utilize Meta’s advertising services. Meta generates
 3 substantially all of its revenue from selling advertisement placements:

Year	Total Revenue	Ad Revenue	% Ad Revenue
2021	\$117.93 billion	\$114.93 billion	97.46%
2020	\$85.97 billion	\$84.17 billion	97.90%
2019	\$70.70 billion	\$69.66 billion	98.52%
2018	\$55.84 billion	\$55.01 billion	98.51%

7 100. One of Meta’s most powerful advertising tools is Meta Pixel, formerly known as
 8 Facebook Pixel, which launched in 2015 and its software development kit (SDK).

9 101. Meta touted Meta Pixel as “a new way to report and optimize for conversions, build
 10 audiences and get rich insights about how people use your website.” According to Meta, to use Meta
 11 Pixel an advertiser need only “place a single pixel across [its] entire website to report and optimize
 12 for conversions” so that the advertiser could “measure the effectiveness of [its] advertising by
 13 understanding the action people take on [its] website.” The Meta Pixel is incorporated on 6.7 million
 14 websites, including Favor’s website.

15 102. Similar to the TikTok Pixel, the Meta Pixel is a snippet of code embedded on a third-
 16 party website that tracks a users’ activity as the users navigate through a website. As soon as a user
 17 takes any action on a webpage that includes the Meta Pixel, the code embedded in the page re-directs
 18 the content of the user’s communication to Meta while the exchange of the communication between
 19 the user and website provider is still occurring.

20 103. Through this technology, Meta intercepts each page a user visits, what buttons they
 21 click, as well as specific information they input into the website and what they searched. The Meta
 22 Pixel sends each of these pieces of information to Meta with other identifiable information, such as
 23 the users IP address. Meta stores this data on its own server, in some instances, for years on end.

24 104. This data is often associated with the individual users’ Facebook account. For
 25 example, if the user is logged into their Facebook account when the user visits Favor’s website,
 26 Meta receives third party cookies allowing Meta to link the data collected by Meta Pixel to the
 27 specific Facebook user.

1 105. Meta can also link the data to a specific user through the “Facebook Cookie.” The
2 Facebook Cookie is a workaround to recent cookie-blocking techniques, including one developed
3 by Apple, Inc., to track users, including Facebook users.

4 106. Lastly, Meta can link user data to individual users through identifying information
5 collected through Meta Pixel through what Meta calls “Advanced Matching.” There are two forms
6 of Advanced Matching: manual matching and automatic matching. Using Manual Advanced
7 Matching the website developer manually sends data to Meta to link users. Using Automatic
8 Advanced Matching, the Meta Pixel scours the data it receives to search for recognizable fields,
9 including name and email address to match users to their Facebook accounts.

10 107. Importantly, even if Meta Pixel collects data about a non-Facebook user, Meta still
11 retains and uses the data collected through Meta Pixel in its analytics and advertising services. These
12 non-users are referred to as having “shadow profiles” with Meta.

13 108. At the time Plaintiff Jane Doe used the Favor Platform, she maintained active
14 Facebook and Instagram accounts. Plaintiff Jane Doe accessed Favor Platform from the same device
15 she used to visit Facebook and Instagram, and Meta associated the data it collected about her from
16 the Favor Platform with her Facebook and Instagram accounts.

17 109. Meta offers an analogous mobile version of the Meta Pixel known as a software
18 development kit (SDK) to app developers. Meta’s SDK allows app developers “to track events, such
19 as a person installing your app or completing a purchase.” By tracking these events developers can
20 measure ad performance and build audiences for ad targeting.

21 110. Meta’s SDK collects three types of App Events. Automatically Logged Events “logs
22 app installs, app sessions, and in-app purchases.” Standard Events are “popular events that Facebook
23 has created for the app.” Custom Events are “events [the app developer] create that are specific to
24 [the] app.”

25 111. Once the data intercepted through the Meta Pixel or SDK is processed, Meta makes
26 this data available through its Events Manager, along with tools and analytics to reach these
27 individuals through future Facebook ads. For instance, this data can be used to create “custom
28

1 audiences” to target the user, as well as other Facebook users who match members’ of the audiences’
2 criteria.

3 112. In addition to using the data intercepted through Meta Pixel and the SDK to provide
4 analytics services, Meta uses this data to improve its personalized content delivery, advertising
5 network, and machine-learning algorithms, including by improving its ability to identify and target
6 users.

7 113. Meta has no way to limit or prohibit the use of data collected through Meta Pixel and
8 its SDK given Meta’s open systems and advanced algorithms.

9 114. According to leaked internal Meta documents, one employee explained “You pour
10 that ink [i.e., data] into a lake of water . . . and it flows . . . everywhere . . . How do you put that ink
11 back in the bottle? How do you organize it again, such that it only flows to the allowed places in the
12 lake?”

13 115. In these same leaked documents, another employee explained Meta does “not have
14 an adequate level of control and explainability over how our systems use data, and thus we can’t
15 confidently make controlled policy changes or external commitments such as ‘we will not use X
16 data for Y purpose.’ And yet, that is exactly what regulators expect us to do, increasing our risk of
17 mistakes and misrepresentation.” Thus, once the data enters the Meta system, either through its SDK
18 or Pixel, the data can be used for any and all purposes.

19 116. Meta’s own employees confirmed no one at Meta can state confidently where all the
20 data about a user is stored and used. In a recent court hearing as part of the Cambridge Analytica
21 scandal of 2018, Meta’s own engineers testified there was not a “single person” at Meta who could
22 answer that question.

23 117. Favor uses the Meta Pixel and SDK on the Favor Platform. As a result, Favor
24 disclosed and Meta intercepted users’ interactions on the Favor Platform. For instance, Meta
25 received users’ specific responses to medical history and other health questions Favor asked in
26 connection with a visit for birth control. This included highly sensitive medical information as
27 reflected in paragraphs 4-6, 13, 71-74 above.

28

1 118. Plaintiff Jane Doe provided her PII, health information, and other sensitive data to
2 Favor to obtain birth control, emergency contraception, and condoms, this information was sent to
3 Meta.

4 119. Plaintiff Jane Doe did not consent to the interception or disclosure of her data to
5 Meta. Favor’s disclosure, and Meta’s interception, of Plaintiff Jane Doe’s PII, health data, and other
6 highly sensitive information without her consent is an invasion of privacy and violates several laws,
7 including the CMIA and CIPA.

8 **E. FullStory and Session Replay**

9 120. FullStory was founded in 2014 and is a data analytics company that offers a variety
10 of products, from data collection to analytics. The company raised close to \$170 million in funding
11 and is valued at over \$1.5 billion as of August 4, 2021.

12 121. FullStory is one of the leading session replay companies in the market today, touting
13 its capabilities as “a modern way to collect user experience data” where “the amount of valuable
14 information FullStory captures is second to none”

15 122. According to FullStory, “A website represents thousands and thousands of UX [user
16 experience] decisions, and with FullStory [they] can ‘watch’ sessions and frequently uncover
17 opportunities.”

18 123. FullStory “watch[es] sessions” through sophisticated session replay code that runs in
19 the background of any given website or mobile application. Its session replay code makes a
20 “detailed accounting of every action that takes place on [the] site or app. From mouse movements
21 and clicks to screen swipes or typing.” Each of these pieces of data are bundled, transmitted, and
22 then “store[d] and organize[d]” by FullStory on their platform, along with a unique identifier (i.e.,
23 UserID and SessionID) for each particular user whose communications they intercept.

24 124. As a result, website visitors’ interactions with and communications on websites that
25 incorporate this software, like the Favor Platform, are disclosed to and intercepted by FullStory in
26 real-time.

27 125. Once this data is disclosed and intercepted, FullStory provides a dashboard platform
28 that provides its clients “access [to] data that’s automatically indexed, fully retroactive, and

1 instrumentation-free to get insight into all digital interactions.” On FullStory’s dashboard, its clients
2 are able to filter the sessions and identify users based on their actions on the site.

3 126. Not only does FullStory intercept vast amounts of data from its clients’ websites, it
4 also leverages that data to provide analytics insights such as factors impacting the sites conversions
5 and device-specific bugs. It also supplies custom conversion analyses using its “extensive searchable
6 data.”

7 127. While FullStory claims that it “requires users to block sensitive information from
8 being recorded,” it does not have the capability to do so and does not enforce that policy. As
9 explained in paragraphs 52-54 above, researchers have shown that FullStory’s “automated redaction
10 process,” which purportedly prevents sensitive information like health data from being recorded,
11 does not successfully remove that data.

12 128. Favor intentionally incorporates FullStory’s session replay software on the Favor
13 Platform. As a result, Favor disclosed and FullStory intercepted each of its users’ interactions on
14 the Favor Platform along with a unique ID that can individually identify the user. For instance,
15 FullStory received users’ type of medication, side effects, and allergies, as well as other responses
16 to health questions. Thus, if a user previously used a birth control with side effects, Favor disclosed
17 and FullStory intercepted this information along with the name of the medication.

18 129. Plaintiff Jane Doe provided her PII, health information, and other sensitive data to
19 Favor to obtain birth control, emergency contraception, and condoms, this information was
20 intercepted by FullStory.

21 130. Plaintiff Jane Doe did not consent to the interception or disclosure of her data to Full
22 Story. Favor’s disclosure, and Full Story’s interception, of Plaintiff Jane Doe’s PII, health data, and
23 other highly sensitive information without her consent is an invasion of privacy and violates several
24 laws, including the CMIA and CIPA.

25 **F. Plaintiff and Class Members Do Not Consent to Defendants’ Conduct**

26 131. Plaintiff and Class members had no way of knowing that Favor was disclosing, and
27 Advertising and Analytics Defendants were intercepting, their communications when interacting
28 with the Favor Platform, because their software is inconspicuously incorporated in the background.

1 132. This conduct is all the more egregious given the nature of the information entered
2 into the Favor Platform, e.g., PII, requests for prescriptions, and identifiable medical information,
3 among other things. Plaintiff and Class members would not expect this information to be disclosed
4 or intercepted without their consent.

5 133. This is especially true given Favor’s consistent representations that this information
6 would remain private and confidential. Favor promises that it “takes the privacy of [users’] data and
7 information very seriously” and that “[a]ll of the information [Favor] hold[s] is *treated as Protected*
8 *Health Information (PHI)*.” Accordingly users’ “data is held to *even stricter privacy standard* than
9 required by CCPA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), California
10 Confidentiality Of Medical Information Act, Texas Medical Privacy Act, as some examples.)”

11 134. It later states that it “understand[s] that medical information about [users] and [their]
12 health is personal” and that Favor is “committed to protecting it” and, further, that no “personal
13 information” would be disclosed to third parties, including analytics companies.

14 135. Doubling down, it then states in all bold and capital letters, Favor ensures users “WE
15 DO NOT SELL OR MARKET YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION AT ANY TIME.” It claims
16 that it only discloses “is “aggregated” and “non-identifying” and, even then, that third parties cannot
17 use information “for their commercial purposes.”

18 136. Favor repeats these assurances throughout its privacy policy, stating that it is
19 “required by law to make sure that medical information which identifies [users] is kept private (with
20 certain exceptions).” These “exceptions” include the disclosure of users’ information for things like
21 treatment and law enforcement needs and do not include the disclosure of users’ information for
22 marketing, advertising, tracking, or analytics to companies like Advertising and Analytics
23 Defendants.

24 137. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class members did not consent to Defendants’ conduct.

25 **G. Plaintiff and Class Members have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in their**
26 **User Data**

27 138. Plaintiff and Class members have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
28 communications on the Favor Platform, including their health information.

1 139. Privacy polls and studies uniformly show that the overwhelming majority of
2 Americans consider one of the most important privacy rights to be the need for an individual’s
3 affirmative consent before a company collects and shares its customers’ personal data.

4 140. For example, a recent study by *Consumer Reports* shows that 92% of Americans
5 believe that internet companies and websites should be required to obtain consent before selling or
6 sharing consumers’ data, and the same percentage believe internet companies and websites should
7 be required to provide consumers with a complete list of the data that has been collected about them.
8 Moreover, according to a study by *Pew Research Center*, a majority of Americans, approximately
9 79%, are concerned about how data is collected about them by companies.

10 141. Users act consistent with these preferences. Following a new rollout of the iPhone
11 operating software—which asks users for clear, affirmative consent before allowing companies to
12 track users—85% of worldwide users and 94% of U.S. users chose not to share data when prompted.

13 142. Another recent study by DataGrail revealed that 67% of people were willing to pay
14 \$100 or more annually to keep their information out of the hands of companies and the government.
15 The same study revealed that 75% of people would abandon brands that do not take care of their
16 data.

17 143. Other privacy law experts have expressed concerns about the disclosure to third
18 parties of a users’ intimate health data. For example, Dena Mendelsohn—the former Senior Policy
19 Counsel at Consumer Reports and current Director of Health Policy and Data Governance at Elektra
20 Labs—explained that having your personal health information disseminated in ways you are
21 unaware of could have serious repercussions, including affecting your ability to obtain life insurance
22 and how much you pay for that coverage, increase the rate you’re charged on loans, and leave you
23 vulnerable to workplace discrimination.

24 144. This data is also extremely valuable. According to Experian, health data is a “gold
25 mine” for healthcare companies and clinicians.

26 145. Consumers’ health data, including what prescriptions they have, are extremely
27 profitable. For instance, Datarade.ai advertises access to U.S. customers names, addresses, email
28 addresses, telephone numbers who bought brand name medicine. The starting price for access to

1 just some of this data was \$10,000. Other companies, like Pfizer, spend \$12 million annually to
2 purchase health data and the medical data industry itself was valued at over \$2.6 billion back in
3 2014.

4 146. Defendants' surreptitious disclosure and interception of Plaintiff's and Class
5 members' privacy communications, including PII, health information, and other sensitive data
6 violates Plaintiff's and Class members' privacy interests.

7 **TOLLING, CONCEALMENT, AND ESTOPPEL**

8 147. The applicable statutes of limitation have been tolled as a result of Defendants'
9 knowing and active concealment and denial of the facts alleged herein.

10 148. Defendant Favor secretly incorporated Advertising and Analytics Defendants'
11 software into the Favor Platform, providing no indication to users that they were interacting with
12 sites that shared their data, including PII and medical information, with third parties.

13 149. Defendants had exclusive knowledge that the Favor Platform incorporated
14 Advertising and Analytics Defendants' software, yet failed to disclose that fact to users, or that by
15 interacting with the Favor Platform, Plaintiff's and Class members' sensitive data, including PII and
16 health data, would be disclosed to and intercepted by third parties

17 150. Plaintiff and Class members could not with due diligence have discovered the full
18 scope of Defendants' conduct, including because it is highly technical and there were no disclosures
19 or other indication that would inform a reasonable consumer that Favor was disclosing, and third
20 parties were intercepting, data from the Favor Platform.

21 151. The earliest Plaintiff and Class members could have known about Defendants'
22 conduct was shortly before the filing of this Complaint.

23 152. Defendants were under a duty to disclose the nature and significance of their data
24 collection practices but did not do so. Defendants are therefore estopped from relying on any statute
25 of limitations under the discovery rule.

26 153. Additionally, Defendants engaged in fraudulent conduct to prevent Plaintiff and
27 Class members from discovering the disclosure and interception of their data. Favor misled Plaintiff
28

1 and Class members to believe their data, including health information and PII, would not be
2 disclosed or intercepted.

3 154. Favor represented to Plaintiff and Class members that they applied even stronger
4 restrictions on the sharing of data than those imposed by HIPAA and the CMIA. It also promised
5 Plaintiff and Class members that their “personal information” would not be disclosed. No Defendant
6 disclosed the misconduct alleged herein.

7 155. Plaintiff and Class members were not aware that Defendants disclosed and
8 intercepted their data, including PII and health information.

9 156. Plaintiff and Class members exercised due diligence to uncover the facts alleged
10 herein and did not have actual or constructive knowledge of Defendants’ misconduct by virtue of
11 their fraudulent concealment.

12 157. Accordingly, all statute of limitations are tolled under the doctrine of fraudulent
13 concealment.

14 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

15 158. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
16 individually and on behalf of the following Class:

17 **Nationwide Class:** All natural persons in the United States who used the Favor
18 Platform and whose communications and/or data were shared with third parties,
including any of the Advertising and Analytics Defendants.

19 159. Excluded from the Class are: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action
20 and any members of their immediate families; (2) the Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries,
21 affiliates, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents
22 have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers, and directors; and
23 (3) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel.

24 160. **Numerosity:** The exact number of members of the Class is unknown and unavailable
25 to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder in this case is impracticable. The Class likely consists
26 of millions of individuals, and the members can be identified through Favor’s records.

1 161. **Predominant Common Questions:** The Class' claims present common questions
2 of law and fact, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual Class
3 members. Common questions for the Class include, but are not limited to, the following:

- 4 • Whether Defendants violated Plaintiff's and Class members' privacy rights;
- 5 • Whether Defendants' acts and practices violated the Common Law Invasion of
6 Privacy;
- 7 • Whether Defendants were unjustly enriched;
- 8 • Whether Defendants' acts and practices violated California's Confidentiality of
9 Medical Information Act, Civil Code §§ 56, *et seq.*;
- 10 • Whether Defendants' acts and practices violated the California Invasion of
11 Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 630, *et seq.*;
- 12 • Whether Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to equitable relief,
13 including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, restitution, and disgorgement; and
- 14 • Whether Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to actual, statutory, punitive
15 or other forms of damages, and other monetary relief.

16 162. **Typicality:** Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the
17 Class. The claims of Plaintiff and the members of the Class arise from the same conduct by
18 Defendants and are based on the same legal theories.

19 163. **Adequate Representation:** Plaintiff has and will continue to fairly and adequately
20 represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and
21 experienced in complex litigation and class actions, including litigations to remedy privacy
22 violations. Plaintiff has no interest that is antagonistic to the interests of the Class, and Defendants
23 have no defenses unique to any Plaintiff. Plaintiff and their counsel are committed to vigorously
24 prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and they have the resources to do so.
25 Neither Plaintiff nor their counsel have any interest adverse to the interests of the other members of
26 the Class.

27 164. **Substantial Benefits:** This class action is appropriate for certification because class
28 proceedings are superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this

1 controversy and joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. This proposed class action
2 presents fewer management difficulties than individual litigation, and provides the benefits of single
3 adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Class treatment
4 will create economies of time, effort, and expense and promote uniform decision-making.

5 165. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the foregoing class allegations and definitions
6 based on facts learned and legal developments following additional investigation, discovery, or
7 otherwise.

8 **CALIFORNIA LAW APPLIES TO THE ENTIRE CLASS**

9 166. California substantive laws apply to every member of the Class. California's
10 substantive laws may be constitutionally applied to the claims of Plaintiff and the Classes under the
11 Due Process Clause, 14th Amend. § 1, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Art. IV. § 1 of the U.S.
12 Constitution. California has significant contact, or significant aggregation of contacts, to the claims
13 asserted by Plaintiff and Class members, thereby creating state interests to ensure that the choice of
14 California state law is not arbitrary or unfair.

15 167. Favor, Meta, and TikTok maintain their principal places of business in California
16 and conduct substantial business in California, such that California has an interest in regulating
17 Favor, Meta, and TikTok's conduct under its laws. Favor and Meta also each selected California
18 law as the law to govern all disputes with their customers in their respective terms of service.
19 Defendants Favor, Meta, and TikTok's decision to reside in California and avail themselves of
20 California's laws, renders the application of California law to the claims herein constitutionally
21 permissible.

22 168. The application of California laws to the Class is also appropriate under California's
23 choice of law rules because California has significant contacts to the claims of Plaintiff and the
24 proposed Class, and California has a greater interest in applying its laws here given Defendants'
25 locations and the location of the conduct at issue than any other interested state.

26
27 ///

28 ///

1 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

2 **FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

3 **Violation of Common Law Invasion of Privacy – Intrusion Upon Seclusion**
4 **(On Behalf of the Plaintiff and the Class)**
5 **(Against all Defendants)**

6 169. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the preceding allegations of this Complaint with
7 the same force and effect as if fully restated herein.

8 170. A Plaintiff asserting claims for intrusion upon seclusion must plead (1) that the
9 defendant intentionally intruded into a place, conversation, or matter as to which Plaintiff has a
10 reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) that the intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable
11 person.

12 171. Favor’s disclosure of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ private medical data, including
13 PII, health information, prescription requests and other interactions on the Favor Platform, to third
14 parties like Advertising and Analytics Defendants constitutes an intentional intrusion upon
15 Plaintiff’s and Class members’ solitude or seclusion.

16 172. Plaintiff and Class members had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the health
17 information and other personal data that Favor disclosed to third parties. Plaintiff’s health
18 information, prescription requests and other interactions with the Favor Platform are inherently
19 sensitive in nature. Plaintiff and Class members reasonably expected this information would remain
20 private and confidential and would not be disclosed to third parties without their consent.

21 173. This expectation is especially heightened given Favor’s consistent representations to
22 users that this information would be safeguarded and not disclosed to third parties like TikTok,
23 Meta, and Full Story.

24 174. Favor promised that it “takes the privacy of [users’] data and information very
25 seriously” and that “[a]ll of the information [Favor] hold[s] is *treated as Protected Health*
26 *Information (PHI).*” Accordingly users’ “data is held to *even stricter privacy standard* than
27 required by CCPA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), California
28 Confidentiality Of Medical Information Act, Texas Medical Privacy Act, as some examples.)”

1 175. With respect to medical information in particular, Favor represents that it
2 “understand[s] that medical information about [users] and [their] health is personal” and that Favor
3 is “committed to protecting it.” Favor ensured users that it is “required by law to make sure that
4 medical information which identifies [users] is kept private (with certain exceptions).” These
5 “exceptions” include the disclosure of users’ information for things like payment and law
6 enforcement purposes and did not include the disclosure of users’ information for marketing,
7 advertising, tracking, or analytics.

8 176. Favor equally promises users that it does not disclose to third parties, including
9 analytics companies, any “personal information.”

10 177. Favor represents the only information it discloses is “aggregated” and “non-
11 identifying” and that third parties cannot use information “for their commercial purposes.” It states
12 it all bold and capital letters “WE DO NOT SELL OR MARKET YOUR PERSONAL
13 INFORMATION AT ANY TIME.”

14 178. Given these representations, Plaintiff and Class members had a reasonable
15 expectation of privacy in their data relating to their use of the Favor Platform and expected this
16 information would not be disclosed.

17 179. Plaintiff and Class members did not consent to, authorize, or know about Favor’s
18 intrusion at time it occurred. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class members never agreed that Favor
19 could disclose their data to third parties.

20 180. The surreptitious disclosure of sensitive data, including PII and health information,
21 from millions of individuals was highly offensive because it violated expectations of privacy that
22 have been established by social norms. Privacy polls and studies show that the overwhelming
23 majority of Americans believe one of the most important privacy rights is the need for an
24 individual’s affirmative consent before personal data is collected or shared.

25 181. The offensiveness of this conduct is all the more apparent because Favor’s disclosure
26 of this information was conducted in secret in a manner that Plaintiff and Class members would be
27 unable to detect through the incorporation of highly technical SDKs and pixels that was contrary to
28 the actual representations made by Favor.

1 182. As a result of Favor’s actions, Plaintiff and Class members have suffered harm and
2 injury, including, but not limited to, an invasion of their privacy rights.

3 183. Plaintiff and Class members have been damaged as a direct and proximate result of
4 Favor’s invasion of their privacy and are entitled to just compensation, including monetary damages.

5 184. Plaintiff and Class members seek appropriate relief for that injury, including, but not
6 limited to, damages that will reasonably compensate Plaintiff and Class members for the harm to
7 their privacy interests as well as a disgorgement of profits made by Favor as a result of its intrusions
8 upon Plaintiff’s and Class members’ privacy.

9 185. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to punitive damages resulting from the
10 malicious, willful, and intentional nature of Favor’s actions, directed at injuring Plaintiff and Class
11 members in conscious disregard of their rights. Such damages are needed to deter Defendants from
12 engaging in such conduct in the future.

13 186. Plaintiff also seeks such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

14 **SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF**
15 **Violation of Common Law Invasion of Privacy – Intrusion Upon Seclusion**
16 **(On Behalf of the Plaintiff and the Class)**
17 **(Against Advertising and Analytics Defendants)**

18 187. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the preceding allegations of this Complaint with
19 the same force and effect as if fully restated herein.

20 188. A Plaintiff asserting claims for intrusion upon seclusion must plead (1) that the
21 defendant intentionally intruded into a place, conversation, or matter as to which Plaintiff have a
22 reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) that the intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable
23 person.

24 189. Advertising and Analytics Defendants surreptitious interception, storage, and use of
25 Plaintiff’s and Class members’ interactions and communications with the Favor Platform, including
26 PII, health information, and prescription requests, constitutes an intentional intrusion upon
27 Plaintiff’s and Class members’ solitude or seclusion.
28

1 190. Plaintiff and Class members expected this information to remain private and
2 confidential given the nature of the Favor Platform, which is primarily used to receive medical
3 advice, treatment, and prescriptions.

4 191. This expectation is especially heightened given Favor's consistent representations
5 that this data would remain confidential. Plaintiff and Class members did not expect third parties,
6 and specifically Advertising and Analytics Defendants, to secretly intercept this information and
7 their communications.

8 192. Plaintiff and Class members did not consent to, authorize, or know about Advertising
9 and Analytics Defendants' intrusion at time it occurred. Plaintiff and Class members never agreed
10 that Advertising and Analytics Defendants could intercept, store, and use this data.

11 193. Defendants' intentional intrusion on Plaintiff's and Class members' solitude or
12 seclusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Plaintiff and Class members reasonably
13 expected, based on Favor's repeated assurances, that their information would not be disclosed to or
14 collected by any third parties, including to Advertising and Analytics Defendants.

15 194. The surreptitious taking and interception of sensitive data, including PII and medical
16 information, from millions of individuals was highly offensive because it violated expectations of
17 privacy that have been established by social norms. Privacy polls and studies show that the
18 overwhelming majority of Americans believe one of the most important privacy rights is the need
19 for an individual's affirmative consent before personal data is collected or shared.

20 195. The offensiveness of this conduct is all the more apparent because Advertising and
21 Analytics Defendants' interception, storage, and use of this information was conducted
22 inconspicuously in a manner that Plaintiff and Class members would be unable to detect and was
23 contrary to the actual representations made by Favor.

24 196. Given the highly sensitive nature of the data that Advertising and Analytics
25 Defendants intercepted, such as private details about medications and health information, this kind
26 of intrusion would be (and in fact is) highly offensive to a reasonable person.

27
28

1 205. Defendants disclosed, intercepted, stored, and used this data for their own gain,
2 providing Defendants with economic, intangible, and other benefits, including highly valuable data
3 for analytics, advertising, and improvement of their platforms, algorithms, and advertising services.

4 206. Had Plaintiff known of Defendants' misconduct, she would not have provided any
5 of her data to Defendants or used the Favor Platform.

6 207. Defendants unjustly retained these benefits at the expense of Plaintiff and Class
7 members because Defendants' conduct damaged Plaintiff and Class members, all without providing
8 any commensurate compensation to Plaintiff and Class members.

9 208. The benefits that Favor derived from Plaintiff and Class members rightly belong to
10 Plaintiff and Class members. It would be inequitable under unjust enrichment principles in
11 California and every other state for Defendants to be permitted to retain any of the profit or other
12 benefits they derived from the unfair and unconscionable methods, acts, and trade practices alleged
13 in this Complaint.

14 209. Defendants should be compelled to disgorge in a common fund for the benefit of
15 Plaintiff and Class members all unlawful or inequitable proceeds that Defendants received, and such
16 other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

17 **FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**
18 **Violation of California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act ("CMIA")**
19 **Civil Code Section 56.06**
20 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**
21 **(Against Favor)**

22 210. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the preceding allegations of this Complaint with
23 the same force and effect as if fully restated herein.

24 211. Favor is a "digital primary care" platform employs doctors and nurse practitioners
25 that evaluate patients, provide medical services, maintain medical information and histories, and
26 prescribe medications, to patients.

27 212. Accordingly, Favor is a provider of healthcare under Cal. Civ. Code Section 56.06,
28 subdivisions (a) and (b), because the Favor Platform maintains medical information and offers
software to consumers that is designed to maintain medical information for the purposes of allowing

1 its users to manage their information or make the information available to a health care provider, or
2 for the diagnoses, treatment, or management of a medical condition.

3 213. Favor is therefore subject to the requirements of the CMIA and obligated under
4 Section 56.06 subdivision (e) to maintain the same standards of confidentiality required of a
5 provider of health care with respect to medical information that it maintains on behalf of users.

6 214. The CMIA defines medical information to mean any “individually identifiable
7 information” in possession of or derived from “a provider of health care, health care service plan,
8 pharmaceutical company, or contractor regarding a patient’s medical history, mental or physical
9 condition, or treatment.” As explained above, the information Favor maintained and disclosed is
10 medical information because it is identifiable information relating to patient’s medical histories,
11 conditions, treatments, and prescriptions.

12 215. Favor violated Cal. Civ. Code Section 56.06(e) because it did not maintain the
13 confidentiality of users’ medical information. Favor disclosed to third parties Plaintiff’s and Class
14 members’ medical information without consent, including information concerning medications they
15 were taking or were prescribed, their medical histories, allergies, and answers to other health-related
16 questions.

17 216. Favor shared this identifiable information with third parties, including Meta, TikTok,
18 and FullStory and whose primary business includes selling advertisements, analytics, or other
19 insights based on the data they obtain about individuals, and using such data to improve their
20 products, services, and algorithms.

21 217. Favor knowingly and willfully disclosed medical information without consent to
22 Advertising and Analytics Defendants for financial gain. Namely, to sell more products, advertise,
23 obtain analytics, and improve the Favor Platform, in violation of Cal. Civ. Code Section 56.06(e).
24 Favor’s conduct was knowing and willful as they were aware that Advertising and Analytics
25 Defendants would obtain all user data input while using their sites, yet intentionally embedded
26 Advertising and Analytics Defendants’ code anyway.

27 218. At the very least, Favor negligently disclosed medical information to Advertising
28 and Analytics Defendants in violation of Cal. Civ. Code Section 56.06(e).

1 219. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to: (1) nominal damages of
2 \$1,000 per violation; (2) actual damages, in an amount to be determined at trial; (3) statutory
3 damages pursuant to 56.36(c); and reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs reasonably
4 incurred.

5 **FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**
6 **Violation of CMIA**
7 **Civil Code Section 56.101**
8 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**
9 **(Against Favor)**

10 220. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the preceding allegations of this Complaint with
11 the same force and effect as if fully restated herein.

12 221. California Civil Code Section 56.101, subdivision (a) requires that every provider of
13 health care “who creates, maintains, preserves, stores, abandons, destroys, or disposes of medical
14 information shall do so in a manner that preserves the confidentiality of the information contained
15 therein.”

16 222. Any health care provider who “negligently creates, maintains, preserves, stores,
17 abandons, destroys, or disposes of medical information shall be subject to remedies and penalties
18 provided under subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 56.36[.]”

19 223. Favor is a provider of healthcare who creates, maintains, preserves, stores, abandons,
20 destroys, or disposes of medical information.

21 224. Favor failed to maintain, preserve, and store medical information in a manner that
22 preserves the confidentiality of the information contained therein because it disclosed to Advertising
23 and Analytics Defendants, Plaintiff's and Class members' medical information, including
24 information concerning medications they were taking or were prescribes, their medical histories,
25 including allergies, and answers to other health-related questions.

26 225. Favor's failure to maintain, preserve, and store medical information in a manner that
27 preserves the confidentiality of the information was, at the least, negligent and violates Civil Code
28 section 56.101, subdivision (a).

29 226. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to: (1) nominal damages of
30 \$1,000 per violation; (2) actual damages, in an amount to be determined at trial; (3) statutory

1 damages pursuant to 56.36(c); and reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs reasonably
2 incurred.

3 **SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**
4 **Violation of CMIA**
5 **Civil Code Section 56.10**
6 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**
7 **(Against Favor)**

8 227. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the preceding allegations of this Complaint with
9 the same force and effect as if fully restated herein.

10 228. California Civil Code Section 56.10, subdivision (a), prohibits a health care provider
11 from disclosing medical information without first obtaining an authorization, unless a statutory
12 exception applies.

13 229. Favor disclosed medical information without first obtaining authorization when it
14 disclosed to third parties Advertising and Analytics Defendants Plaintiff's and Class members' data,
15 including PII, prescription information, medical histories, including allergies, and answers to other
16 health-related questions. No statutory exception applies.

17 230. Favor knowingly and willfully disclosed medical information without consent to
18 Advertising and Analytics Defendants for financial gain. Namely, to market and advertise its
19 services, or to allow others to market and advertise its services, in violation of Cal. Civ. Code
20 Section 56.10, subdivision (a).

21 231. At the very least, Favor negligently disclosed medical information in violation of
22 Cal. Civ. Code Section 56.10, subdivision (a) through the unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff's and
23 Class members' sensitive medical information.

24 232. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to: (1) nominal damages of
25 \$1,000 per violation; (2) actual damages, in an amount to be determined at trial; (3) statutory
26 damages pursuant to 56.35; and reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs reasonably
27 incurred.

28 ///

///

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Aiding and Abetting Violation of CMIA
Civil Code Section 56.06, 56.101, 56.10
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
(Against Advertising and Analytics Defendants)

1
2
3
4 233. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the preceding allegations of this Complaint with
5 the same force and effect as if fully restated herein.

6 234. As set forth herein, Favor’s disclosure of Plaintiff’s and Class members medical
7 information violates the CMIA.

8 235. By contracting with Favor to receive and use Plaintiff’s and Class members’ data and
9 communications, including medical information, as well as providing the means to accomplish this
10 objective, Advertising and Analytics Defendants acted intentionally or alternatively, with
11 knowledge that Favor’s misappropriation of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ medical information
12 was a violation of the CMIA.

13 236. Advertising and Analytics Defendants provided substantial assistance and
14 encouragement to Favor’s violation of the CMIA, including by providing the means, i.e., Meta Pixel
15 and SDK, TikTok Pixel, and FullStory’s session replay, to share and disclose this data. Advertising
16 and Analytics Defendants knew that their software could be seamlessly integrated without alerting
17 users that their sensitive medical information would be shared with Advertising and Analytics
18 Defendants.

19 237. Advertising and Analytics Defendants’ agreements with Favor and receipt of
20 Plaintiff’s and Class members’ sensitive information, including medical information, is a substantial
21 factor in causing the violations of the CMIA alleged herein. For example, in the absence of Meta
22 Pixel and SDK, the TikTok Pixel, and FullStory’s session replay, Favor would likely not have shared
23 Plaintiff’s and Class members’ medical information.

24 238. Given the lucrative value of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ medical information,
25 Advertising and Analytics Defendants were willing to receive, and encouraged, Favor to share this
26 data. As a result, Advertising and Analytics Defendants aided and abetted Favor’s CMIA violations
27 and are therefore jointly liable with Favor for the relief sought by Plaintiff and the Class.
28

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of CMIA
Civil Code Section 56.36
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
(Against Advertising and Analytics Defendants)

1
2
3
4 239. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the preceding allegations of this Complaint with
5 the same force and effect as if fully restated herein.

6 240. California Civil Code Section 56.36(B)(3)(A) prohibits any person of entity other
7 than a licensed health care professional from knowingly or willfully obtaining medical information
8 for financial gain.

9 241. California Civil Code Section 56.36(B)(5) prohibits any person or entity who is not
10 permitted to receive medical information under the CMIA from knowingly and willfully obtaining,
11 disclosing, or using the medical information without written authorization.

12 242. Advertising and Analytics Defendants are entities who are not licensed health care
13 professionals, and Advertising and Analytics Defendants are not permitted to receive medical
14 information under the CMIA.

15 243. Advertising and Analytics Defendants violated California Civil Code
16 Section 56.36(B)(3)(A) and (B)(5) because they knowingly and willfully obtained medical
17 information from the Favor Platform without authorization for their own financial gain.

18 244. As described herein, Advertising and Analytics Defendants intentionally designed
19 their software, i.e., the Meta Pixel and SDK, TikTok Pixel, and FullStory's session replay, to
20 intercept data from the websites and mobile applications in which they are incorporated.

21 245. Advertising and Analytics Defendants knew this software was incorporated on
22 websites and mobile applications that would consequently lead to the interception of medical
23 information, including medical information input in the Favor Platform.

24 246. Advertising and Analytics Defendants knowingly and willfully received this
25 information without written authorization from Plaintiff and Class members, and did so for their
26 own financial gain. Namely, to profit through advertising and analytics services they offer, as well
27 as to improve their algorithms, data points, and other technologies.

1 interception and use of the contents of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ communications.
2 Additionally, Favor and Meta have adopted California substantive law to govern their relationship
3 with users.

4 253. Meta Pixel and SDK, the TikTok Pixel, and FullStory’s session replay software,
5 Plaintiff’s and Class members’ browsers and mobile applications, and Plaintiff’s and Class
6 members’ computing and mobile devices are a “machine, instrument, contrivance, or . . . other
7 manner.”

8 254. At all relevant times, Meta, using its Meta Pixel and SDK, TikTok, using its TikTok
9 Pixel, and FullStory, using its session replay technology, intentionally tapped or made unauthorized
10 connections with, the lines of internet communication between Plaintiff and Class members and
11 Favor’s website and app without the consent of all parties to the communication.

12 255. Advertising and Analytics Defendants, willfully and without the consent of Plaintiff
13 and Class members, reads or attempt to reads, or learn the contents or meaning of Plaintiff’s and
14 Class members’ communications to Favor while the communications are in transit or passing over
15 any wire, line or cable, or were being received at any place within California when it intercepted
16 Plaintiff’s and Class members’ communications and data with Favor, who is headquartered in
17 California, in real time.

18 256. Advertising and Analytics Defendants used or attempted to use the communications
19 and information they received through their Pixel, SDK, and session replay technology, including
20 to supply analytics and advertising services.

21 257. By incorporating Advertising and Analytics Defendants’ technology on its website,
22 Favor aided, agreed with, employed, and conspired with Advertising and Analytics Defendants to
23 carry out the wrongful conduct alleged herein.

24 258. The interception of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ communications was without
25 authorization and consent from the Plaintiff and Class members. Accordingly, the interception was
26 unlawful and tortious.

27 259. Plaintiff and the Class members seek statutory damages in accordance with
28 § 637.2(a), which provides for the greater of: (1) \$5,000 per violation; or (2) three times the amount

1 of damages sustained by Plaintiff and the Class in an amount to be proven at trial, as well as
2 injunctive or other equitable relief.

3 260. Plaintiff and Class members have also suffered irreparable injury from these
4 unauthorized acts. Plaintiff's and Class members' sensitive data has been collected, viewed,
5 accessed, stored, by Advertising and Analytics Defendants, have not been destroyed, and due to the
6 continuing threat of such injury, have no adequate remedy at law, Plaintiff and Class members are
7 entitled to injunctive relief.

8 **TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**
9 **Violation of CIPA**
10 **Cal. Penal Code § 632**
11 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass)**
12 **(Against Advertising and Analytics Defendants)**

13 261. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the preceding allegations of this Complaint with
14 the same force and effect as if fully restated herein.

15 262. Cal. Penal Code § 632 prohibits “intentionally and without the consent of all parties
16 to a confidential communication,” the “use[] [of] an electronic amplifying or recording device to
17 eavesdrop upon or record the confidential communication”.

18 263. Section 632 defines “confidential communication” as “any communication carried
19 on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be
20 confined to the parties thereto[.]”

21 264. Plaintiff's and Class members' communications to Favor, including their sensitive
22 medical information including information concerning medications they were taking or were
23 prescribed, their medical histories, allergies, and answers to other health-related questions, were
24 confidential communications for purposes of § 632, including because Plaintiff and Class members
25 had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in this data

26 265. Plaintiff and Class members expected their communications to Favor to be confined
27 to Favor in part, because of Favor's consistent representations that these communications would
28 remain confidential. Plaintiff and Class members did not expect third parties, and specifically
Advertising and Analytics Defendants, to secretly eavesdrop upon or record this information and
their communications.

1 D. Awarding such injunctive and other equitable relief as the Court deems just and
2 proper;

3 E. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class members statutory, actual, compensatory,
4 consequential, punitive, and nominal damages, as well as restitution and/or disgorgement of profits
5 unlawfully obtained;

6 F. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class members pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;

7 G. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class members reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and
8 expenses; and

9 H. Granting such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

10 Dated: January 5, 2023

LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP

11 By: /s/ (Eddie) Jae K. Kim

(Eddie) Jae K. Kim (CA Bar No. 236805)
117 East Colorado Blvd., Suite 600
Pasadena, CA 91105
Tel.: (626) 550-1250
ekim@lcllp.com

LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP

Gary F. Lynch (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
Jamisen A. Etzel (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
Nicholas A. Colella (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
1133 Penn Ave., 5th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Tel.: (412) 322-9243
gary@lcllp.com
jamisen@lcllp.com
nickc@lcllp.com

LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.

Christian Levis (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
Amanda Fiorilla (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
Rachel Kesten (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
Christopher Devivo (*pro hac vice* forthcoming)
44 South Broadway, Suite 1100
White Plains, NY 10601
Tel.: (914) 997-0500
Fax: (914) 997-0035
clevis@lowey.com
afiorilla@lowey.com
rkesten@lowey.com
cdevivo@lowey.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class